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AbstractI present a simple Simultaneous Abstraction Calculus,1 where the familiar -abstraction over single variables is replaced by abstraction over whole sets ofthem. Terms are applied to partial assignments of objects to variables. Variantsof the system are investigated and compared, with respect to their semantic andproof theoretic properties.The system overcomes the strict ordering requirements of the standard -calculus, and is shown to provide the kind of \non{selective" binding needed forDynamic Montague Grammar and Discourse Representation Theory. It is closelyrelated to a more complex system, due to Peter Aczel and Rachel Lunnon, andcan be used for Situation Theory in a similar way. I present versions of these the-ories within an axiomatic, property{theoretic framework, based on Aczels FregeStructures.The aim of this work is to provide the means for integrating various semantictheories within a formal framework, so that they can share what is commonbetween them, and adopt from each other what is compatible with them.1Earlier versions of parts of this work have been previously published by the au-thor under the title A Simultaneous Abstraction Calculus and Theories of Semantics, in[Cooper & Groenendijk 1994], and slightly updated in [Seligman et al. 1995]. The completedraft, before corrections, has also been published under the current title, in [Cooper et al. 1996].iii
ContentsAcknowledgements iiAbstract iii1 Introduction 11.1 Basic Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Why Simultaneous Abstraction? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2.1 Variables: \Bound yet Free" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81.2.2 Axiomatic Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.2.3 Bealer's Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.3 Other Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Simultaneous Abstraction 132.1 Simple Simultaneous Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.1.1 Syntax for  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.1.2 Semantics for  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152.1.3 Basic Properties of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.1.4 Partial Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202.2 Aczel{Lunnon Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212.2.1 Relating , AL, and  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232.2.2 Proof Theory for AL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252.2.3 The Church{Rosser Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272.3 Combinatory Aczel{Lunnon Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312.3.1 Completeness for CAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332.3.2 Abstraction in CAL-models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34iv
2.3.3 Completeness for AL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372.4 Structured Objects and Systems of Equations . . . . . . . . . . . 393 Semantic Theories 413.1 Frege Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413.1.1 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463.2 Dynamic Montague Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483.2.1 Some DMG Translations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503.3 Discourse Representation Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533.3.1 Zeevat's DRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533.3.2 !-Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553.3.3 Kamp Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563.3.4 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583.4 Situation Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603.4.1 States of Aairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613.4.2 Barwise Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 633.4.3 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 644 Further Directions 664.1 True Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664.2 A Typed System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684.3 -DRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724.3.1 Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 774.3.2 Some -DRT Translations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 784.4 A Note on Appropriateness and Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . 804.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81References 83Index 86v
Chapter 1IntroductionLinguistic semantics seems to have become a true Babel of newly invented andever changing logical formalisms, where much research is dedicated to the businessof translating between them. I will add another two or three formalisms to thelist. Yet my aim is not to increase the confusion, but rather to reduce it, bygiving not so much a particular semantic formalism but a formal framework inwhich various semantic theories can be cast, in a way that allows them to shareexplicitly what they have in common. My faint hope is to regain some of theunity in semantics that has been lost over the last decade or so, during whichthe authority of Montague's Higher Order Intensional Logic (IL) was so badlyeroded. The proposed systems contain no really new ideas, but rather stealelements of existing formalisms and put them together so that their commonroots are clearly exposed. The most prominent common feature of the theoriesdiscussed in this work is their use of some form of simultaneous abstraction. I willgive (variations of) a formal system of simultaneous abstraction and application,as the backbone for a set of theories which are obtained by the addition of axiomsof truth, following the lead of Property Theory.1.1 Basic AssumptionsLet me briey outline the underlying philosophical assumptions of this work. Iwon't attempt to defend them here, as that would be another thesis.1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2I will be concerned with theories of meaning that t into the wider realm ofdenotational semantics. I take it that utterances in some natural language arerelated, in virtue of their phonological, syntactic and contextual features, to theircontents (meanings), which are relatively abstract objects such as propositions,in the paradigm case of assertoric sentences. What propositions are is a matteropen to dispute, but I take it to be fundamental for them to be capable of beingtrue or false, thus taking us to a truth conditional form of semantics. A semantictheory should make predictions of the kind that given certain things being truecertain other things having to be true as well, which are to be judged againstintuitions about logical consequence.How to precisely make the links between meaning, truth, and logical conse-quence within this broader paradigm of semantics is again a matter of debate.Most widely known theories take the model theoretic line, following Tarski, anduse some formal language to facilitate the interpretation. Logical consequencesare then regarded as preserving truth under the reinterpretation of the non-logicalsymbols of that language. I do not wish to subscribe to this Tarski-Bolzano viewof logic, for reasons given in [Etchemendy 1990], and thus refrain from deninglogical consequence along those lines. I follow Etchemendy's view that an ade-quate theory of meaning must be able to separate out changes of meaning fromchanges of the way things are in the world, and the latter seem to lie at theheart of logic as I understand it. In following Property Theory, in the form ofFrege Structures [Aczel 1980], I believe that this distinction is being made quiteclearly.1 Still, the proposed framework is pretty much open to a Tarskian viewof logic, if one wishes to uphold it, and I will not try to develop and defend analternative conception here, which would be based on the variation of circum-stances which make propositions true, rather than the variation of the meaningof the \non-logical" pieces of syntax.In emphasising matters of truth I do not mean to assert that semantics isnothing but the assignment of truth conditions to sentences, or utterances, orthat propositions are to be identied with truth conditions, or distinguishable1One might say that meanings are xed by the interpretation k  k in a particular -model,while matters of fact are reected in the extension T of the truth predicate in a Frege Structure,based on that -model.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3only on the basis of these. The most prominent theory which follows these coarsegrained lines, by identifying propositions with sets of logically possible worlds,has long been known to suer from fundamental inadequacies in the analysis ofpropositional (and other) attitudes. I take it as a guiding principle of semanticsthat propositions and other contents of utterances must be plausible candidatesfor being the objects of our attitudes. The content of an assertion is somethinga sincere and competent speaker believes, and wishes to convey to his audience,thus hopefully contributing to the spread of knowledge in his community.The links between the notions of content, propositions, truth, and attitudes,as I have outlined them, are largely subscribed to by the particular semantictheories I will discuss in this work, or they come at least close to it, if we pushthem a little in this direction.Montague Grammar (MG) for example, [Montague 1974], in most of its formssubscribes to the identication of propositions with sets of possible worlds. Theseare the objects of propositional attitudes, and they are truth bearers in the sensethat they may or may not contain the actual world. Versions of MG whichdo not make this identication, and operate along property theoretic lines in-stead, have been proposed, for example in [Thomason 1980] and the more recent[Chierchia 1994]. The latter work will concern me here in particular, as it presentsa dynamic version of MG. It follows Dynamic Montague Grammar (DMG) of[Groenendijk & Stokhof 1990], but takes intensionality at face value and appearsless baroque in its treatment of dynamic binding.Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), [Kamp 1981], appears to regardpropositions as rather syntactic objects, the Discourse Representation Structures(DRSs), whose truth is a matter of anchoring its Discourse Referents with respectto an appropriate model. I propose to regard DRSs as particular kinds of rela-tions, which are easily turned into propositions by existential quantication, orby application (anchoring) to individuals. They are not to be confused with theirnotations, although one may argue that they are almost as highly structured asthe latter. I believe this view can make sense of the kind of theory of attitudes
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4envisaged in [Kamp 1990], at least to some extent, without identifying the ob-jects of attitudes with syntactic structures.2 I have no quarrel with a syntactictheory of mind as such, but I do not think it is embodied in the meaning of ourintensional idiom.Situation Theory (ST) [Barwise & Perry 1983] can be taken to promote theidea that propositions have two ingredients: a situation and a state of aairs(infon, fact). Truth depends upon the \support" of the state of aairs by thesituation, and the actuality of the situation, if abstract \possible" situations areadmitted into the ontology. Not all versions of ST take such a narrow viewof propositions, see [Barwise & Cooper 1991], and neither do I. With regardsto attitudes ST tends to stress the role of situations, yet it is generally agreed,following the critique of ST in [Soames 1985], that they do not allow us to dispensewith a highly structured view of propositions and states of aairs.I stand in some distance to theories of \dynamic" semantics that stress thechanges in information states brought about by the processing of sentences. Therecan be no doubt that such changes are of utmost importance, and that a theoryof meaning worth its money must say something insightful about such matters,but this does not, on my view, relieve us from coming up with a serious theoryof propositional contents as relata of attitudes. It seems to me to be in fact aprecondition for any realistic dynamic theory. DMG, DRT, and ST all seem toconform fairly well to this traditional view, despite occasional rhetoric to thecontrary.1.2 Why Simultaneous Abstraction?Since Montague's pioneering use of IL for the semantics of a fragment of English,-abstraction has continued to play a key role in linguistic semantics. Yet, while(repeated) unary abstraction may be all we need for mathematical logic, it looks2Robin Cooper takes a similar view in [Cooper 1995]. In contrast to him, I do not thinkthat simultaneous abstraction by itself provides an analysis of what Kamp calls the \sharing"of discourse referents in [Kamp 1990].For a more radical, syntactic approach to attitudes, see [Asher 1993], who does not onlyregard DRSs as the \language of thought", but also takes attitude reports to refer to theseformal structures.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5less satisfactory when we encounter linguistic applications, in particular to lan-guages with more freedom in their word order than English. It is awkward, if notgenuinely inadequate, to impose a strict order on the denotations of predicativeexpressions, which then has to be undone by sophisticated means, to cope withwords coming in the \wrong" order. Moreover it seems slightly puzzling howeasily logicians with Realist views on properties and relations seem to extrap-olate the order of words of their preferred language into the structure of thoseindependently existing entities. Yet, my main reason for embarking into simulta-neous abstraction is that it is already being put to good use, if often in disguisedforms, in linguistic semantics. Forms of simultaneous abstraction seem to be atwork in the three prominent semantic approaches of the post Montagovian erato be discussed in this thesis, namely in Discourse Representation Theory, Dy-namic Montague Grammar, especially when it is based on the Dynamic PropertyTheory (DPT) of [Chierchia 1994], and modern Situation Theory, as describedin [Barwise & Cooper 1991], with its underlying theory of abstraction (AL) de-veloped in [Aczel & Lunnon 1991].The basic principle of simultaneous abstraction I take to be that the -operator takes a whole set of variables, or something to that eect, rather thanjust one at a time (or a list that is easily \curried" into a sequence of singularabstractions). To give a concrete example, we may write something likefx; yg:likes(x; y)in a system like the language  of the next chapter.3 The absence of any orderin fx; yg creates the problem of dening a sensible operation of application. Wemay want to express the fact that Robert Parker likes Dominus. So we need away to unambiguously determine which of the objects rob and dom ll which ofthe positions abstracted over. The solution to this diculty comes in the form3The reader may suspend concerns regarding the order in likes(x; y) until the coming chap-ter. Notice though how application of likes to x and y turns an ordered relation into anunordered one, where the variables act as identiers for the roles of the relation.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6of application to assignments. I write the application in question as(fx; yg: likes(x; y)) (x:rob; y:dom)which then reduces to likes(rob; dom). Our abstracts denote, or correspond to,functions from assignments to objects of some kind; in this case a function fromvariable assignments to propositions.4 It is instructive to regard the free vari-ables in an open formula as a kind of paradigm case: the denotation of an openformula is precisely a function from variable assignments to the contents of closedexpressions. Other examples are not hard to nd either.DRSs for example are usually taken to be pairs hU;Ci consisting of a set Uof variables (the \universe of discourse markers" of the DRS) and a conjunctiveset C of \conditions". In giving truth conditions to DRSs the variables in Uare read as being \non-selectively" existentially quantied, but only those of theoutermost level DRS. Embedded DRSs receive all sorts of quantication over theiruniverses, most prominently a non-selective universal reading of the discoursemarkers in U in a conditional of the form hU;Ci) hU 0; C 0i. Abstraction overits universe seems thus a plausible mechanism for giving a denotation to DRSs,which leaves the quanticational force to be xed explicitly or implicitly by thecontext in which they occur. The standard semantics for DRT does not givean explicit denotation to DRSs, and thus seems to avoid needless complicationsinvolving abstraction, but once we widen our horizons and allow DRSs to occur asarguments of relations, in particular those involving attitudes, the complicationshave to be faced in one way or an other. My inclination is to regard a DRS as aterm U:C, where we abstract over an unordered set of variables U , rather thanin the one by one fashion of IL, and C expresses a ne grained conjunction ofpropositions, rather than a truth value or a set of possible worlds. The contentof a DRS is thus a property in as many arguments as there are variables in itsuniverse.DMG was developed to introduce ideas from DRT into the compositional4Variables are thus used rather like key words in records. Case marking might be regardedin this way for example, when the language in question employs case rather than order for theidentication of the roles of a predicate.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7framework of IL, by means of a new basic type of \states" which are essentiallyassignments of entities to discourse markers. Chierchia's DPT gets rid of thestates as primitives, in favor of explicit assignments which are manipulated bymeans of two operators: u for abstraction, and t for application. In fact theu-operator can be understood as abstracting over the innite set of discoursemarkers, while t applies a term to the current discourse marker assignment.There is no need to be quite so restrictive in what may be abstracted over andapplied to, since the underlying idea is a perfectly general one. In our system anyset of variables can be abstracted over, and any assignment can be applied to.This may dissolve any remaining doubts about the dierence between variablesand discourse markers and simplies matters by eliminating unary abstractionand application as primitive operations from the system.AL nally is a system of simultaneous abstraction in which  takes one-one mappings from labels, called \role indices", to a kind of variables, called\parameters", as input to abstract over an unordered set of variables in one go.Application is performed on assignments of objects to those labels. The aboveexample would look more like this in AL:(hr1 7!X; r2 7!Y i: likes(X; Y )) (r1:rob; r2:dom):The essentially simple core of simultaneous abstraction and application in ALis obscured by some less obvious features of the system, which derive from itshistorical role in modeling Situation Theory via generalizations of the non well{founded set theory of [Aczel 1988]. In particular the theory is developed not asa formal language, but within a highly general setting of a theory of structuredobjects. Some of these objects are of an especially suspect looking \indetermi-nate" kind, namely the \parameters".  is an operation \in the model", whichtakes role{indexed sets of parameters and parametric objects into things called\abstracts". Much concern is devoted to the task of nding structured universescontaining such abstracts, in which systems of equations involving those parame-ters have unique solutions in terms of anchoring the parameters to non-parametricobjects. Given the rather dierent concerns of Linguistics, it is little wonder then
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8that AL has not found widespread popularity among semanticists,5 who remainto be convinced that such sophisticated machinery is needed to achieve theirmodest ambitions. This thesis oers a hopefully more accessible system of si-multaneous abstraction, which shares many { though perhaps not all { of AL'svirtues, despite its comparatively simple minded, traditional design features.1.2.1 Variables: \Bound yet Free"A peculiar hurdle on the way to acceptance of the very idea of simultaneousabstraction is the resulting (partial) loss of -equivalence. For example we havefx; yg:likes(x; y)) 6= fy; xg:likes(y; x)):This loss is an inevitable consequence of the way in which application has towork for such terms. A renaming of variables in an abstraction term will normallychange the object, as the two supposedly equivalent terms will yield dierent re-sults when applied to the same assignment. For example, applying the two termsabove to (x:rob; y:dom) yields two quite dierent results. This should come asno surprise. It is of course well known that free variables cannot be renamed.Neither can the abstracted discourse markers of a DRS be changed without con-sequences: any subsequent anaphoric link depends on the very identity of thevariables in the universe of a DRS. In the same vein no renaming is allowed forDPT discourse markers, may they be free or in the scope of a u-abstraction. Thisis easily demonstrated by an application of t, which frees those discourse markersagain by t u-cancellation. Parameters in AL can be renamed, if abstracted over,but role indices cannot without changing the object.I will not embark here into an argument about whether it is wrong to speak of\abstraction" when there is no (full) -equivalence, though it seems legitimate tome to use the term even in the case of free variables. It is more important to seethat it is not a virtue in itself to be able to rename bound variables, as this meansthat computational work has to be done to establish a trivial identity of objects.Its virtue, as we shall see, lies in obtaining a total substitution operation, which5Robin Cooper is the notable exception.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 9is essential for the full exploitation of -equivalences.The idea that variables may be essential to the identity of a semantic objectis certainly now fairly accepted, due to DRT and its \dynamic" children. Froma more philosophical perspective I would argue that using variables in this wayis no more a contamination of semantic objects by non semantic concepts thanthe common view that the order of arguments to a many place function shouldmatter. From my perspective the charge of a lack in -equivalence exposes thecorresponding lack of permutability for the curried or otherwise ordered systems.1.2.2 Axiomatic SemanticsGiven the apparent similarities between the semantic theories mentioned, it seemsworthwhile to look for a common framework which brings out the similarities aswell as the dierences between theories like DRT, DMG, and ST more clearly andwith formal precision. The core of this framework is my Simultaneous Abstrac-tion Calculus (SAC). Semantic theories can be obtained from it in very muchthe same way as from the Lambda Calculus. I will pursue here an axiomaticapproach that follows the model of Property Theory and Situation Theory intaking the fundamental semantic notions of properties, propositions, and truthpretty much at face value, and describes them by explicit axiomatic theories.One advantage of this approach lies in the possibility to incrementally accumu-late such axioms as more aspects of the structure of propositions get treated,and more ne grained distinctions between propositions are introduced. One canthus be formally explicit about what is common to dierent semantic theoriesand what is not. DMG and DRT for example share a common theory of identityand propositional logic, but diverge in the kinds of quantication they employ,as well as in the syntax{semantics interface. Some form of ST can be obtainedby developing a logic of situation types within such unsituated theories of propo-sitions. Furthermore one can obtain results about the consistency of the variousassumptions behind dierent theories, allowing for safe transfer of solutions fromone to the other, such as for example the use of Situation Theoretic ideas withinDRT or DMG.My approach is minimalist in its spirit, introducing assumptions only when
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 10necessary into ones theories, as explicit claims rather than implicitly into thedenition of the formalism itself. A good example of this is the lack of anytyping of our expressions. I do not want to exclude self-application and the likeright from the start from my framework, and prefer to allow for dierent explicittheories that restrict the formation of meaningful propositions.The topic of relating semantic objects to natural language utterances willbe left largely in the background. I believe that given the spirit of axiomaticspecication of this work a congenial approach would be to formalize the syntax{semantics interface in a way that leaves as much as possible open about theprecise nature of the semantic objects involved.1.2.3 Bealer's PuzzleIn [Bealer 1989] George Bealer has argued that any theory which identies prop-erties with abstractions from propositions, as I am pursuing it, is not ne grainedenough for dealing with attitudes. To quote his example, from the proposi-tion `Jane Fonda follows Rajneesh' (follow(f; r)) one can form the properties to`fondalee' (x:follow(f; x)) and to `rajneesh' (x:follow(x; r)), so that by func-tional application we get that (i) `Jane Fonda rajneeshes' and (ii) `Rajneesh fon-dalees' express the very same proposition ((x:follow(x; r))(f ) = follow(f; r) =(x:follow(f; x))(r)). If one agrees that it is possible to believe (i) without (ii), orat least accepts that a plausible example might be constructed along these lines,then one has to admit that functional application, governed by the principle of-reduction, is guilty of erasing too many distinctions.Bealer's solution is to use combinators for lling and reordering argumentplaces, which do not generate equalities like the one between (i) and (ii) above,but only logical equivalences between distinct propositions. For example insteadof using abstraction to permute a relation R into xy:Ryx, with the resultingequality Rab = (xy:Ryx)ba, he introduces basic operations like conv and pred0such that pred0(pred0(conv(R); b); a) 6= pred0(pred0(R; a); b), but one is truewhenever the other is.One might envisage a transfer of this approach into an unordered setting, yetI nd it plausible that the meanings of incomplete phrases, including words like
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11`fondalee', are learned by grasping what claim they produce in which context ofother meaningful words. Sticking to some device of abstraction, it thus seemsnecessary to invoke a structure preserving notion of predication of propositionalfunctions to their arguments, besides the structure erasing application operation,in order to cope with this puzzle. Bealer's introduction of two kinds of proposi-tions in [Bealer 1982], namely unstructured \conditions" and highly structured\Cambridge propositions" seems to be very much in line with the above distinc-tion. I thus prefer to follow Peter Aczel, [Aczel 1989], and distinguish applicationfrom predication in chapter 3.1.3 Other FrameworksMy approach is very much inspired by the work of Robin Cooper who uses theSituation Theoretic language EKN as a framework in which various semantictheories can be expressed, as in [Cooper 1993]. One problem with his approachis that one seems to be committed to take a formidable number of SituationTheoretic assumptions on board in order to achieve ones often rather limitedaims. In [Cooper & Poesio 1994] an attempt is made to deal with this charge byarranging the axioms into convenient packages, under the banner of \algebraicspecication," in order to allow for a more minimalist use of the tools. Still, thetheory looks quite complex, mainly due to the use of parametric objects with ALstyle abstraction, and the rather fundamental role that is played by situationsand \infons". My hope is that my humbler system of abstraction and moreprominent use of propositions can make things easier to understand and to usein applications. In fact as far I have carried out this work the number axiomshas remained so small that the use of specication methods would seem out ofproportion.Another notable eort to unify the three semantic theories mentioned aboveis found in Reinhard Muskens' work. He does not temper with the basic aspectsof the rigidly typed lambda calculus, but prefers to modify it to cope with thenew challenges. Thus he introduces a new basic type of \states" which by meansof some axioms are in one{one correspondence with discourse marker assign-ments. This allows him to formulate systems of DMG, [Muskens 1992], and DRT,
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 12[Muskens 1994], if in a somewhat indirect manner. The systems are \dynamic" inusing DPL{style relational composition, following [Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991],which allows to capture discourse markers to the right of the syntactic scope ofa quantier. Otherwise he sticks to the identication of propositions with func-tions from worlds to truth values, but in adopting a four values lattice of truthvalues in [Muskens 1989] he eectively turned possible worlds into (im)possiblesituations. This created a version of ST, which is very close to the \classical"theory of [Barwise & Perry 1983].I nd my system as lying in between the in some sense more conservativeapproach of Muskens', and Cooper's embrace of the unfamiliar.
Chapter 2Simultaneous AbstractionIn this part two slightly dierent formalisms for simultaneous abstraction areintroduced. First I look at the conceptually simple, if somewhat unorthodoxlanguage , and then at the proof theoretically more convenient AL, which isequivalent to the original , modulo some additional variables. I give a prooftheory for AL and show the Church{Rosser property for reduction. I investigateAL from a Combinatory Logic perspective, establishing a completeness resultfor it. Finally I discuss structured objects, and the solving of equations, whichmay give us non well-founded objects.For the full understanding of chapter three the proof theoretic sections, par-ticularly from 2.2.3 to the end of 2.3, are not essential.2.1 Simple Simultaneous Abstraction2.1.1 Syntax for Instead of abstracting over single variables, as in standard -calculus, we allow-abstraction over any set of them. Terms are applied to records that assignterms to variables. Ways of introducing unitary abstraction and application intosuch a system will be discussed later on. A puried version of the earlier oeno-logical example, where all applications are now performed uniformly to variableassignments, would now look like this. Let us take z1 and z2 to function as the13
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 14\liker" and \likee" roles of our predicate `likes'.(fx; yg: likes(z1:x; z2:y)) (x:rob; y:dom)By convention dierently indexed variables are always assumed to be non-identical.Denition 1 The language  consists of terms t; t0 : : : built up from basic con-stants c; c0 : : :, and # for \undened," and variables x; y : : : 2 Var by meansof abstraction M:t, for M  Var, and application t(xi:ti)i2I .Notice that terms of the language  are fairly abstract objects, containingsets of variables and unordered records as constituents. We in fact allow innitesets of variables fxigi2I to be abstracted over and also innite records (xi:ti)i2Ito be applied to.1 Innite terms are useful for theoretical purposes, even if inapplications one will have to restrict oneself to finitary , possibly extendedby short hand versions of a few selected innitary expressions.In writing an expression like `fx1; ::; xng:t' or simply `fx1; ::; xng:t' I there-fore do not mean to suggest that the terms denoted by these expressions haveany order in their set of abstracted variables, as one might suspect from theindexing, and neither do I mean to imply that n is a nite number. A similarremark holds for application terms: all indeces are part of the meta language,and may be attached freely to terms, subject only to the convention that dier-ent variables should be indexed dierently. To give a concrete example, I takefx1; x2g:t to be the very same term as fx2; x1g:t, and in the same vein t(x:t1; y:t2)and t(y:t2; x:t1) to be identical -expressions. Thus  is not a language that canbe written, but a convenient abstraction over any systems of the appropriatestructure which allow for free permutation within any particular abstraction orapplication. Order is only signicant for multiple uses of abstraction or applica-tion, for example syntactically (and semantically) fx1gfx2g:t 6= fx2gfx1g:t andt(x:t1)(y:t2) 6= t(y:t2)(x:t1).1The notation `fxigi2I ' stands here for the set fxiji 2 Ig, not for a function from indices tovariables, as it is sometimes used by other authors, such as [Aczel & Lunnon 1991].
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 152.1.2 Semantics for The semantics for  will be a fairly straightforward variation on the semanticsof the untyped Lambda Calculus.2 The crucial dierence is that in our systemthe objects denoted by our terms apply not to objects, but rather to partialassignments of objects to variables. We thus need a set D of objects and away to apply those objects to assignments: with every object d 2 D we needto associate a function 	(d), which I call d's applicative behavior, tellingus which object in D is the value of applying d to which assignment. Thus 	is a mapping from D to (Var ! D) ! D. To deal with partial assignmentswe assume D comes with a distinguished element ?D that plays the role of the\undened object". We write hxi 7! iii2I for the function f such that f (xi) = ifor i 2 I and f (x) = ? otherwise, and let dm(f ) =df fxjf (x) 6= ?g. This isenough to make sense of application for our language: ignoring free variables, weget kt(xi:ti)i2Ik = 	(ktk) (hxi 7! ktikii2I).To interpret an abstraction M:t we look at the interpretation of t undervariation of the objects that may be assigned to the variables in M . In an obviousgeneralisation from standard usage we dene variants gMf of an assignment g fora set of variables M and an assignment f by: gMf (x) = f (x) if x 2M , otherwisegMf (x) = g(x), for all x 2 Var. Thus, given t;M and g there is a function3fVar!D ktkgMf 2 (Var ! D) ! D, from assignments f to the interpretation oft under gMf . This function denes the applicative behavior of M:t. For thedenotation of this term all that is needed is a member ofD which has precisely thisapplicative behavior. We thus assume a mapping  from (Var ! D)! D to Dwhich maps any applicative behavior  to an object () which has this behavior,which is to say that 	(()) = . We are thus dealing with a retractionbetween two domains, written D *)	 C, which is a pair of mappings 	 : D ! Cand  : C ! D such that 	   = idC.One nal point has to be observed though: 	   = idC implies that  isinjective, hence jDj  jCj, which means there cannot be a retraction between2See [Hindley & Seldin 1986] for an introduction into models for the untyped LambdaCalculus.3The `' in the following expression is used as a symbol of the meta language, with thestandard meaning.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 16a set D and the full function space (Var ! D) ! D. One way to cut downthe size of the function space without throwing away some vital functions is towork in the category CPO of complete partial orders with continuous functionsbetween them. So a domain will be understood to be a cpo with a least element?, a mapping between cpo's to be continuous, and the operation ! to formthe space of continuous functions, ordered pointwise. The two mappings of aretraction are in addition required to be strict, that is, to preserve the bottomelement.4 Later, in section 2.3, I will use a combinatory logic to restrict thespace of applicative behaviors without the use of domain theory. I will regardthat version of the semantics as the ocial one.Denition 2 A -model consists of a retraction D *)	 (Var ! D) ! D,and an interpretation = which maps constants into D, with =(#) = ?D. Thedenotation function k  k for terms, under a variable assignment g, is given by: kckg = =(c); kxkg = g(x); kM:tkg =  (fVar!DktkgMf ); kt(xi:ti)i2Ikg = 	(ktkg) (hxi 7! ktikgii2I).A model is non trivial if jDj > 1. Working in CPO the denotations areonly well-dened because the following holds.Theorem 1 fktkgMf is continuous for all terms t.PROOF: Notice that ktk = fktkgVarf is an instance of this. We show by in-duction that lub's h = Fn<! hn of ascending chains of assignments are preserved.I leave the proof of monotonicity to the reader. fkckgMf (h) = =(c) = Fn<! fkckgMf (hn);4For more background information on these notions see also [Barendregt 1984]. Notice thatevery partial assignment function is continuous (if strict), given that Var is a at domain withan added ?, as I will assume.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 17 fkxkgMf (h) = kxkgMh = Fn<! kxkgMhn = Fn<! fkxkgMf (hn); fkM 0:tkgMf (h) = kM 0:tkgMh = f 0ktkgMM 0hf 0 = f 0ktkFn<! gMM 0hnf 0= f 0Fn<! ktkgMM 0hnf 0 = Fn<! f 0ktkgMM 0hnf 0 = Fn<! f 0ktkgMM 0hnf 0= Fn<! kM 0:tkgMhn = Fn<! fkM 0:tkgMf (hn); fkt(xi:ti)i2IkgMf (h) = kt(xi:ti)i2IkgMh = 	(ktkgMh )(hxi 7! ktikgMhii2I)= 	(Fn<! ktkgMhn)(hxi 7! Fm<! ktikgMhmii2I)= (Fn<!	ktkgMhn)(Fm<!hxi 7! ktikgMhmii2I)= Fm<! [(Fn<!	ktkgMhn)(hxi 7! ktikgMhmii2I)]= Fm<! Fn<![	(ktkgMhn)(hxi 7! ktikgMhmii2I)]= Fn<! [	(ktkgMhn)(hxi 7! ktikgMhnii2I)] = Fn<! kt(xi:ti)i2IkgMhn= Fn<!(fkt(xi:ti)i2IkgMf (hn)). 22.1.3 Basic Properties of Denition 3 The free variables of a term are dened by FV (x) = fxg; FV (c) = ;; FV (M:t) = FV (t) nM ; FV (t(xi :ti)i2I ) = FV (t) [ Si2I FV (ti).Lemma 2 If x 62 FV (t) then ktkg = ktkgxd for all g and d.So if x is not free in a term t then the denotation of t is independent of what weassign to x, but this does not mean one could rename bound occurrences of x bysome y which is fresh for t. For example, the denotation of fxg:x is independentof x, but kfxg:xkg 6= kfyg:ykg. The latter becomes clear when we apply thesetwo functions to suitable assignments e.g., kfxgx (x:a; y:b)kg = kakg 6= kbkg =kfygy (x:a; y:b)kg, presuming our model is non trivial.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 18Denition 4 Simultaneous substitution [sj=yj]j2J (dropping the index setwhen no confusion can arise) is a partially dened operation given by: [sj=yj]j2Jx = sj, if x = yj for some j 2 J, otherwise x; [sj=yj]c = c; [sj=yj]j2JM:t = M:[si=yi]i2It, where I = J n fjj yj 2Mg,if M \Si2I FV (si) = ;, otherwise undened;5 [sj=yj] t(xi:ti)i2I = [sj=yj]t (xi:[sj=yj]ti)i2I.An example of an undened substitution would be [y=x]fygtxy, where replac-ing x in txy by y would give undesired results and renaming y is not a possibility.To avoid such trouble we require a fresh variable for a term to occur neitherfree nor bound in it.Let us say that j= t = t0 i for every -model and assignment ktkg = kt0kg.Theorem 3 There are terms t such that:1. 6j= fx1::xngt = fy1::yng[yi=xi]t,2. 6j= fx1::xngfxn+1::xn+mgt = fx1::xn+mgt.This is obvious if non trivial models exist. For the CAL-models of section2.3.2 their existence follows from the non triviality of the term model via theChurch{Rosser Theorem.I will now present a few equations, where the list is not meant to give theaxioms of a complete calculus for . The fact that substitution is not alwaysdened is responsible for the diculties in giving such a list. It means that -reduction cannot be exploited in many cases where one would usually expect itto be useful. Fact 5.3, which allows for some amount of renaming of variables,is just one example of an equation that cannot be derived from the limited -reduction allowed by fact 5.2, because substitution is partial. It seems a goodidea to look for a complete calculus for AL, to be dened later, rather than for, since substitution can be totally dened in that system.5Being undened is meant here in the sense of not producing any result, rather than resultingin #.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 19Lemma 4 ktkgM = k[ti=xi]i2I tkg if [ti=xi]i2It is dened, where M = fxigi2I and = hxi 7! ktikgii2I.PROOF: obvious for atomic terms; kN:tkgM =  fktkgMN f =  fktkgNM 0f 0 =  fk[ti=xi]i2I 0 tkgNf= kN:[ti=xi]i2I 0 tkg = k[ti=xi]i2I N:tkg,where I 0 = I n fijxi 2 Ng, M 0 = fxigi2I 0, 0 = hxi 7! ktikgii2I 0,and ktikg = ktikgNf for all f and all i 2 I 0; kt(yj:sj)j2JkgM = 	(ktkgM )(hyj 7! ksjkgM ij2J)= 	(k[ti=xi]tkg)(hyj 7! k[ti=xi]sjkgij2J) = k[ti=xi] t(yj :sj)j2Jkg. 2Theorem 5 1. j= M:t = N:t for N = M \ FV (t);2. j= fxigi2It (xj:tj)j2J = [tj=xj;#=xi]j2J 0;i2I 0 t,with J 0 = J \ I and I 0 = I n J, if the substitution is dened.3. j= (fxigi2It) (xi:ti)i2I = fzigi2I[zi=xi]i2It (zi:ti)i2I ,where all zi are fresh.PROOF:1. From lemma 2.2. By lemma 2 and 4 for every g in all -models:kM:t (xj:tj)j2Jkg = 	((fktkgMf ))(hxj 7! ktjkgij2J) = ktkgM= k[tj=xj;#=xi]j2J 0;i2I 0tkg,where M = fxigi2I,  = hxj 7! ktjkgij2J 0.3. Again by lemma 2 and 4:kfxigi2I:t (xi:ti)i2Ikg = ktkgM = k[zi=xi]i2ItkgM 00= kfzigi2I[zi=xi]i2It (zi:ti)i2Ikg, with M = fxigi2I, M 0 = fzigi2I, = hxi 7! ktikgii2I, and 0 = hzi 7! ktikgii2I. 2
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 202.1.4 Partial ApplicationIt is very natural to ask for an operation for partially lling the argument rolesof a relation, leaving some of them simply open for more to come. We use thenotation t[x1:t1; ::; xn:tn] for partial application. The semantics is as follows:kt[xi:ti]i2Ikg =df  f (	ktkg)(f fxi j i2Ighxi 7!ktikgii2I):The following properties of partial application are of particular interest, lettingapplication associate to the left.Theorem 6 1. j= fxigi2It [xj:tj]j2J = [tj=xj]j2J 0fxigi2I 0t, if dened,where J 0 = J \ I and I 0 = I n J;2. j= t[xi:ti]i2I[yj:sj]j2J = t[xi:ti; yj:sj]i2I;j2J 0where J 0 = J n fj j 9i yj = xig;3. j= t[xi:ti]i2I(yj:sj)j2J = t(xi:ti; yj:sj)i2I;j2J 0where J 0 = J n fj j 9i yj = xig;4. j= t[xj:tj]j2J = fxigi2I:t(xj:tj; xi:xi)j2J;i2I,if Var = fxij i 2 Ig [ fxjj j 2 Jg, and no xi 2 FV (t[xj:tj]j2J) for i 2 I.Notice that the -conversion of partial application, as expressed in equationNo. 1, does reduce the set of abstracted variables, if the substitution is dened,but never removes the abstraction altogether, even if the set fxigi2I 0 is empty.Notice also that we do not have j= t[] = t unless t is an abstraction term.To have this equation hold in full generality would require our models to beextensional. For that, 	 would have to be an injection, which turns ourretraction into an isomorphism between D and (Var ! D) ! D. But oursemantics is only weakly extensional in that any two abstracts with thesame applicative behavior denote the same object, as they will both denote thevalue of  for this particular behavior.There seems to be a way to dene partial application by means of the fourthequation, or some variant of it which makes equally sure that any further role oft can be lled by some further application. But this cannot be insured because
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 21such roles/variables might occur free in some tj ,6 and thus the side conditionof clause 4 will be violated. In AL there will be no such problem for deningpartial application any more.2.2 Aczel{Lunnon AbstractionThe language  is closely related to Barwise and Cooper's Extended Kamp Nota-tion (EKN), see [Barwise & Cooper 1991], which is based on Aczel and Lunnon'stheory of abstraction. In EKN -abstraction operates on injective functions froma set of role indices to parameters. In the case of  those two notions are mergedinto one, the variables, which allows us to replace the injections by simple sets.Variables thus play a double role in our system: as role identiers and asmeans for directing the values for such roles into the intended slots. We haveseen that this creates problems, as by virtue of their former function, variablescan often not be renamed and thus certain substitutions, such as [x=y]fxgtxy,cannot be performed. A similar problem is encountered when we try to nd anabstraction term t0 which uses the same role x on two levels of abstraction, sothat t0(x:a)(x:b) = tab. The simple idea of two abstractions fxgfxgtxx fails as theouter role x cannot be linked to the correct position in t for reasons of interferencewith x's use as a role identier in the inner abstraction. Using dierent variablesinstead creates the problem that application can no longer be to assignments tox in both arguments.The following system revises  by separating the two uses of variables, usingAL-style syntax. The old variables x; y; :: 2 Var will now be used as roles only,while upper case variables, called \parameters" go into the positions of terms, toassign values into their intended positions. Our standard example becomes now(hX 7!x; Y 7!yi:likes(z1:X; z2:Y )) (x:rob; y:dom) ;where I have turned the mapping hx 7! X; y 7! Y i, as it would appear in AL,6They might even be free in t itself, if it is not an abstraction.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 22around for convenience.7 The term t0 we were looking for above can now be con-structed as hY 7!xihZ 7!xi:tY Z. It thus seems possible that such a move mayincrease the expressivity for our system. I will show that the new language ALis in fact equivalent to the old , modulo some additional variables, but the prooftheory is suciently simpler for the new language to warrant it's introduction.Denition 5 The terms t; t0; ::: of AL are built up from constants c;#; :: andparameters X; Y; :: by means of abstraction :t over injective functions from parameters to variables (=roles), and application t(xi:ti)i2I .Semantically we stay in the same space of domains D *)	 (Var ! D) ! Das for , with the only dierence being that we now interpret under assignmentsof objects to parameters, called anchors, and that these have to be obtainedfrom assignments to roles when we dene the meaning of abstraction.Denition 6 A AL-model is a -model, where the denotation function k  kfor terms, under an anchor g, is given by: kckg = =(c); kXkg = g(X); k:tkg =  fVar!Dktkgdm()f ; kt(xi:ti)i2Ikg = 	(ktkg)(hxi 7! ktikgii2I).Given that we always have enough fresh parameters at our disposal, whichcan be insured by requiring jParj > jVarj, we can dene partial applicationby t[xi:ti]i2I =df hXj 7!xjij2J:t(xi:ti; xj:Xj)i2I;j2J;7In AL, the mappings in abstractions take roles to parameters injectively. In turning themaround we could be more general, by allowingseveral parameters to be mapped to the same role,which is equivalent to replacing those parameters with one of them, which then gets mapped tothe role in question. Notice that associating one parameter with many roles in one abstractionclearly makes no sense. My semantics for AL will not presuppose injectivity, but I will assumeit here nevertheless for convenience.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 23where fxjjj 2 Jg = Varnfxiji 2 Ig and the Xj are fresh. The resulting semanticsfor partial application is the same as for the basic operation we added to . Noticethat innitary abstraction is used to achieve such expressivity.The move to AL solves the problems with substitution in , as substitutioncan now be totally dened by means of renaming parameters, so that for example[X=Y ]hX 7!zi:tXY = hZ 7!zi:tZX.2.2.1 Relating , AL, and The question that needs to be addressed is whether we gain more from the switchfrom  to AL than just convenience. There might be terms in the new languagewhich have no equivalent in the original language . To show that no seriousgain in expressive power is made we have to face the earlier diculty for  again,namely that of allowing multiple uses of roles in dierent levels of abstraction,without clash of variables. Such \role recycling" is made easy in AL by usingdierent parameters in a term like hY 7!xihZ 7!xi:tY Z. In creating a -termwith the same role x used twice we faced the problem of the outer abstraction infxgfxg:txx being vacuous, thus failing to connect x to the intended position. Thesolution is to inject an intermediate role y to arrive at fxg((fygfxgtyx) (y:x)). Tohave such roles available at all times we expand our language  to 0 with itsnew set of variables x; y; :::2 Var0 = Var[ Par. The idea can now be applied infull generality.Denition 7 The Translation [xi=Xi]yi2I : AL ! 0 under a substitution isdened by: [xi=Xi]yi2IXi = xi; [xi=Xi]yc = c; [xi=Xi]yi2I hYj 7!yjij2J:t= (fXigi2I 00fyjgj2J:[yj=Yj; xi=Xi]yj2J;i2I 0t) (Xi:xi)i2I 00 ,where K = I n fij9j2J Xi = Yjg, I 0 = K n fij9j2J xi = yjg,and I 00 = K \ fij9j2J xi = yjg; [xi=Xi]yt(yj:tj)j2J = [xi=Xi]yt (yj :[xi=Xi]ytj)j2J .
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 24It is of course possible to interpret AL-terms in the expanded 0-models. Sofor any such model we have the following fact.8Lemma 7 ktkg = k[xi=Xi]yi2Itkg, where  = hxi 7! Xiii2I.PROOF: The proof proceeds by induction over AL-terms, with the abstrac-tion clause providing the only non-trivial step. For this let us write M for fyjgj2J, for hYj 7!yjij2J, and 0 for hxi 7! Xiii2I 0. Thenk[xi=Xi]yi2I hYj 7!yjij2J:tkg= kfXigi2I 00fyjgj2J[xi=Xi; yj=Yj]yi2I 0;j2Jt (Xi:xi)i2I 00kg= kfyjgj2J[xi=Xi; yj=Yj]yi2I 0;j2J tkg0=  fk[xi=Xi; yj=Yj]yi2I 0;j2Jtk(g0)Mf=  fk[xi=Xi; yj=Yj]yi2I 0;j2Jtkgdm()f (0[ 1)=  fktkgdm()f= khYj 7!yjij2J:tkg 2Translation from  to AL is a fairly trivial matter.Denition 8 Let  : Var! Par be some xed injection. We dene an injectionz : ! AL, based on , by cz = c; xz = (x); (M:t)z = hxz 7! xix2M:tz; t(xi:ti)zi2I = tz(xi:tzi )i2I .Theorem 8  can be embedded in AL and AL can be embedded in 0.Let us turn to , the untyped -calculus, see [Hindley & Seldin 1986]. It isclear that we can dene unary abstraction X:t and application t(t0) for AL in8This Lemma does not depend on any assumptions about the size of Par. Hence thefollowing encodability results go through with jVarj = jParj = jVar0j.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 25terms of a designated role z, used solely for that purpose, as hX 7! zi:t andt(z:t0) respectively. By the translations between AL and 0 we see that unaryabstraction/application for -terms can be encoded in 0,9 allowing us to useexpressions such as x:t and t(t0) as shorthands for AL{ or 0-terms, accordingto our preferences.Corollary 9 -abstraction and application for -terms can be encoded in 0.10I will from now on take AL as my ocial language for the Simultaneous Ab-straction Calculus, and regard the use of  as well as standard -terms as syntac-tic sugar. Occurrences of small variables x as terms, or in abstractions x:t andf:::; x; :::g:t, can be taken as shorthands for their corresponding z-translationsinto AL, based on the \upper-case" mapping from variables to parameters, andthe encoding of .2.2.2 Proof Theory for ALThe complications in clause three of the translation from AL to  indicatewhy a complete and reasonably simple set of equations for  will be hard tond. The slightly more complex language AL seems more suitable for this task.The notions of free parameters and substitution are assumed to be dened instraightforward adaption of these notions from the -calculus, to be found in[Hindley & Seldin 1986].9It is obvious that -terms, for example xy:xy, cannot be encoded in  in the naive way,as fxgfyg:x(z:y) or something of similar simplicity. If we follow the path suggested, viaAL, the example term becomes hX 7! zihY 7! zi:X(z:Y ). Translation into 0 proceeds asfollows:[]yhX 7!zihY 7!zi:X(z:Y ) =(fgfzg[z=X]yhY 7!zi:X(z:Y )) () =fzg[z=X]yhY 7!zi:X(z:Y ) =fzg((fXgfzg:[z=Y ]yX(z:Y ))(X:z)) =fzg((fXgfzg:X(z:z))(X:z)).Notice that the -equivalence of xy:xy and x0y:x0y becomes, under this encoding,an instance of Theorem 5.3, which allows us to rename X by X0 in the resulting 0-term.10The innitary nature of , and the treatment of application to over{ and under{denedassignments, rule out a similarly straightforward encoding in . I have not investigated thematter any further. Notice that  is encoded in nitary (AL).
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 26Denition 9 We write Ax ` t = t0 i t = t0 can be derived when the set ofequations Ax is added to the calculus below. t = t0 stands for ` t = t0, andt t0 i ` t = t0 can be proved without using R1.A1 t = t;A2 t(xi:ti; xj:#)i2I;j2J = t(xi:ti)i2I ;A3 :t = :t for  = jFP (t);A4 hXi 7!xiii2It = hYi 7!xiii2I[Yi=Xi]i2It for fresh Yi's;A5 hXi 7!xiii2It (xj:tj)j2J = [tj=Xj;#=Xi]j2J 0;i2I 0twith J 0 = J \ I and I 0 = I n J;A6 #(xj:tj)j2J = #;A7 :# = #;R1 t = t0 = t0 = t;R2 t = t0; t0 = t00 = t = t00;R3 t = t0; si = s0i (i 2 I) = t(xi:si)i2I = t0(xi:s0i)i2I ;R4 t = t0 = :t = :t0.Given innitary terms, we are stretching the notion of \proof" somewhat withthis system: \Being a proof" is not recursive, as termhood is not, and we alsohave a potentially innitary rule R3. If we restrict the calculus to equationsbetween nite terms we get a notion of proof which is much better behaved. Iwill call that system the finitary -calculus.11 Notice that -reduction of anite term never produces an innite one, even in the innitary calculus, as thereis no Axiom or rule other than R1, by which to obtain an equation t = s betweena nite t and an innite s from equations that are not of this form.Theorem 10 (Soundness) t = t0 ) j= t = t0:11It is clear that \having a proof" is not going to be recursive even for the nitary calculus,by the embedding of  in nitary AL.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 272.2.3 The Church{Rosser TheoremThe reduction relation  is of crucial importance for computational concerns, asit provides us with a way of simplifying terms, possibly to a normal form, which isa term that cannot be further reduced. By the embedding of the -calculus, givenearlier, it is obvious though that reduction does not always lead to smaller terms,or terminate at some normal form.12 In such a situation it is highly desirable to besure that reduction cannot lead into blind alleys, from which a possibly existingnormal form cannot be found. It is also critical to have a unique one, if existent, atleast up to the renaming of bound parameters. Both these facts are consequencesof the Church{Rosser property, or confluence, of the calculus, which saysthat any two terms that are -equal reduce to a common term. The followingproof uses Tait's method, as described in [Hindley & Seldin 1986], to establishconuence for reduction, and may be skipped without loss for the understandingof later sections.Denition 10 1. A redex is an occurrence of a term t, possibly inside another term s, which can be contracted by one of the axiomsA2; A3; A5; A6; A7.2. t = t0 i t = t0 can be proved from A1; A4; R1 : : :R4. This is called achange of bound parameters.3. tAn t0 i t = t0 can be proved from A1; R1 : : :R4 and a single contractionof a redex r in t by An, where n 2 f2; 3; 5; 6; 7g. This is called a one stepreduction of t over redex r.A reduction t  t0 can thus be split into a sequence of changes of boundparameters and one step reductions. From a one step reduction of t to t0 we getvarious residuals r0 of occurrences of terms r in t. Let s be the redex contractedto s0 in a one step reduction: if r is not part of s or vice versa then the unchanged r is r's residual; if r = s then r has no residual;12For example take t = (x:f(xx))(x:f(xx)), which reduces to t ft f(ft)  : : : withoutever nding a normal form.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 28 if s is contained in r then the r0 which results from replacing s by s0 in r isr's residual; the case of r being part of s will not be relevant here.The notion of residuals is transitively extended to sequences of one step re-ductions.Denition 11 A minimal complete development (mcd) for a term t anda set of redexes r1; : : : ; rn in t is a sequence of one step reductions, one per ri,such that any residual r0i of a redex ri is contracted after every residual r0j of anyredex rj inside ri.13 This may be followed by some changes of bound parameters.We write t mcd s i there is an mcd for t resulting in s.Lemma 11 1. t s ) FP (s)  FP (t).2. t = t0 ^ si = s0i (i 2 I) ) [si=Xi]i2It = [s0i=Xi]i2It0.3. t mcd s ^ t = t0 ) t0 mcd s.Lemma 12 t mcd t0 ^ si mcd s0i (i 2 I) ) [si=Xi]i2Itmcd [s0i=Xi]i2It0.PROOF: By the previous lemma we can assume without loss of generalitythat no Xi or free parameter of any si (and thus of any s0i) is bound in t. Alsowe may assume the given mcd's not to contain any -steps. By induction on t: t = X, t = c are trivial. t = :pLet t0 = :p0, with p mcd p0 and either (i)  =  or (ii)  = jFP(p0) A3-contracting t's residual in the last step. Then[si=Xi]t = :[si=Xi]pmcd :[s0i=Xi]p0 = [s0i=Xi]t0 in case (i), while in case(ii) :[s0i=Xi]p0 A3 :[s0i=Xi]p0 = [s0i=Xi]t0, which is still an mcd.Case (iii) is t0 = # from A7 applied to :#. Then[si=Xi]t = :[si=Xi]pmcd :[s0i=Xi]# = :#A7 # is an mcd.13The reduction order may not be fully determined by this.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 29 t = p(yj :qj)j2JFor case (i) where t0 = p0(yj:q0j)j2J 0 , p mcd p0, qj mcd q0j for (j 2 J) andJ = J 0 or t's residual was A2-contracted in the last step, we have[si=Xi]t = [si=Xi]p (yj:[si=Xi]qj)j2Jmcd[s0i=Xi]p0 (yj:[s0i=Xi]q0j)j2J = [s0i=Xi]t0or A2[s0i=Xi]t0, which is an mcd.Case (ii) has t0 = [q0j=Yj;#=Yk]j2J 0;k2K 0m from using A5 on t's residual,with pmcd p0 = hYk 7!ykik2K:m and qj mcd q0j (j 2 J). Then[si=Xi]t = [si=Xi]p (yj:[si=Xi]qj)j2J mcd [s0i=Xi]p0 (yj:[s0i=Xi]q0j)j2J= hYk 7!ykik2K:[s0i=Xi]m (yj:[s0i=Xi]q0j)j2JA5 [[s0i=Xi]q0j =Yj;#=Yk]j2J 0;k2K 0:[s0i=Xi]m = [s0i=Xi]t0, which is an mcd.Case (iii) is t0 = # from A6 applied to #(yj:q0j)j2J . Then[si=Xi]t = [si=Xi]p (yj:[si=Xi]qj)j2J mcd [s0i=Xi]# (yj:[s0i=Xi]q0j)j2J A6 #,which is an mcd. 2Lemma 13 t mcd u^ tmcd v ) 9w umcd w ^ v mcd w:PROOF: We may again assume the given mcd's not to contain any -steps.By induction on t: t = X, t = c are trivial. t = :pLet u = 0:p0 and v = 00:p00, both possibly derived by an A3-contractionof t's residual in the last step. By induction hypothesis there is a p+ withp0 mcd p+ and p00 mcd p+. Chose w = +:p+, where + = jFP(p+).If u or v are #, using A7 in the last step, choose w = #. The mcd isobtained by p+ = # using A7.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 30 t = p(yj :qj)j2J(i) For the case that u = p0(yj:q0j)j2J 0 and v = p00(yj:q00j )j2J 00 , both possiblyinvolving an A2-contraction on t's residual, we choose w = p+(yj:q+j )j2J+,where p0 mcd p+, p00 mcd p+, q0j mcd q+j , q00j mcd q+j for j 2 J, andJ+ = fj 2 Jj q+j 6= #g.(ii) If u or v are #, from A6 in the last step, choose w = #. The mcd isobtained by p+ = # as in (i), using A6 for the last step.(iii) Otherwise u, and possibly v, are derived using A5 for t's residual.So let t = hYk 7! ykik2K:m (yj:qj)j2J, and u; v come from u0 = hYk 7!ykik2K:m0 (yj:q0j)j2J and v0 = hYk 7! ykik2K:m00 (yj:q00j )j2J . There arem+; q+j with m0mcdm+, m00mcdm+, q0jmcd q+j , and q00j mcd q+j for j 2 J.Choose w = [q+j =Yj;#=Yk]j2J+;k2K+m+, with J+ = J\K and K+ = K nJ.Let u = [q0j=Yj;#=Yk]j2J 0;k2K 0m0 come from u0 by A5, possibly contractingp's residual by A3 beforehand. Then umcd w by the previous lemma.If v comes from v0 in the same way, the same argument applies. Oth-erwise v = v0 or it is derived from v0 by A2 or A3. Let v = hYk 7!ykik2K:m00 (yj:q00j )j2J. Then v mcd hYk 7! ykik2K:m (yj:qj )j2J withm = m+ and qj = q+j , without any -steps. By a nal A5-step we get[qj=Yj;#=Yk]j2J0;k2K0m = w by lemma 13.2, whence v mcd w. 2Theorem 14 (Church{Rosser Theorem) t = t0 ) 9s t s ^ t0  s:PROOF: If t = t0 then there are t = t1; t2; : : : ; tn = t0 such that ti mcd ti+1or ti+1mcd ti. The claim follows by induction on n using the previous lemma. 2
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 312.3 Combinatory Aczel{Lunnon LogicIn this section I will develop Combinatory Aczel{Lunnon Logic (CALL) whichrelates to the SAC in the way that standard Combinatory Logic relates to the-calculus. It provides us with a more general notion of a model for the SACthan the previous domain-theoretic one. I will obtain a completeness result forthe proof theory of AL relative to these models.This section is quite technical, and presupposes some familiarity with Combi-natory Logic and its relation to the -calculus, on the level of the relevant partsof [Hindley & Seldin 1986]. It may be skipped without much loss for the laterchapters.Denition 12 The language CAL consists of terms T; U; T 0 : : :, built up fromconstants #; c; c0; ::; S and Kx for each x 2 Var, and parameters X; Y; :: bymeans of application T (xi:Ti)i2I .We use z as a distinguished variable for unary application, writing T (T 0) forT (z:T 0). For the interpretation of CAL we do not use cpo's but at sets D? withan added \undened" object ?. Hence functions are no longer required to becontinuous either. The free parameters FP (T ) of a term T are simply theparameters occurring in T , as we have no abstraction mechanism in CAL.Denition 13 A CAL-algebra consists of a set D?, an operation  : (D? (Var!D?)) ! D?, and an interpretation = : Const! D?, such that =(#) =?D, =(S) = s, and =(Kx) = kx for all x 2 Var, where for all f; h; k 2 (Var !D?):1. kx  f  h = f (x) for x 2 Var;2. s  f  h  k = f (z)  k  hx 7! h(x)  kix2Var;3. ?D  f = ?D.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 32The denotation of terms under an anchor g : Par ! D? is inductively obtainedby:1. kckg = =(c);2. kXkg = g(X);3. kT (xi:Ti)i2Ikg = kTkg  hxi 7! kTikgii2I.Lemma 15 X 62 FP (T ) ) kTkg = kTkgXd .We write j=CL T = T 0 if kTkg = kT 0kg in every CAL-algebra. The prooftheory for CALL looks like this.Denition 14 We write T =CL T 0 i T = T 0 can be proved from the axiomshemata and rules below.A1 T = T ;A2 T (xi:Ti; xj:#)i2I;j2J = T (xi:Ti)i2I;A3 Kxj (xi:Ti)i2I (yk:Uk)k2K = Tj,if j 2 I, otherwise #;A4 S(xi:Ti)i2I (yj:T 0j)j2J (vk:T 00k )k2K = Ti(vk:T 00k )k2K(yj:T 0j(vk:T 00k )k2K)j2J ,if z = xi for some i 2 I, otherwise #;A5 #(xi:Ti)i2I = #;R1 T = T 0 = T 0 = T ;R2 T = T 0; T 0 = T 00 = T = T 00;R3 T = T 0; Ui = U 0i (i 2 I) = T (xi:Ui)i2I = T 0(xi:U 0i )i2I ;Theorem 16 (Soundness) T =CL T 0 ) j=CL T = T 0:
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 332.3.1 Completeness for CALDenition 15 Let [T ] =df fT 0jT =CL T 0g. We dene the CAL-term algebraTCL by D? =df f[T ]jT 2 CALg, ? =df [#], =(c) =df [c] for all constants, and[T ]  hxi 7! [Ti]ii2I =df [T (xi:Ti)i2I ].Lemma 17 TCL is a CAL-algebra.PROOF: By A2 and R3 the operation  is well-dened for TCL. We need tocheck the axioms.1. [Kxk]  hxi 7! [Ti]ii2I  hyj 7! [T 0j]ij2J = [Kxk(xi:Ti)i2I(yj:T 0j)j2J ] = [Tk] ifk 2 I, else [#], whence = hxi 7! [Ti]ii2I(xk).2. [S]  hxi 7! [Ti]ii2I  hyj 7! [T 0j]ij2J  hvk 7! [T 00k ]ik2K= [Ti(vk:T 00k )k2K(yj:T 0j(vk:T 00k )k2K)j2J], if z = xi for some i 2 I,otherwise = [#], and thus= hxi 7! [Ti]ii2I(z)  hvk 7! [T 00k ]ik2K  hyj 7! [T 0j]  hvk 7! [T 00k ]ik2Kij2J.3. [#]  hxi 7! [Ti]ii2I = [#(xi:Ti)i2I ] = [#]. 2Lemma 18 kTkg = [T ], where g(X) = [X] for X 2 Par.PROOF: kckg = [c] and kXkg = [X] by denition. By induction kT (xi:Ti)i2Ikg= kTkg  hxi 7! kTikgii2I = [T ]  hxi 7! [Ti]ii2I = [T (xi:Ti)i2I]. 2Theorem 19 (Completeness) j=CL T = T 0 ) T =CL T 0:PROOF: If T 6=CL T 0 then [T ] 6= [T 0] and thus TCL 6j=CL T = T 0 by theprevious lemma. 2
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 342.3.2 Abstraction in CAL-modelsThe operations  : (D?(Var!D?))! D? and 	 : D? ! ((Var!D?)! D?)are interdenable by d  f = 	(d)(f ). The range of 	 are the representablefunctions of a given CAL-algebra, written ((Var ! D?) ! D?)rep. For -models these were just the continuous functions w.r.t. a given order. Now wehave s and the kx to make sure we have enough representable functions in orderto be able to simulate abstraction. A function h : D? ! D? is represented byany d 2 D? such that 8f:Var!D? d f = h(f (z)). I will write d  b for d  hz 7! biif no confusion will arise.Let K =df Kz and x =df SKxK. This gives us projections, as xj (xi:Ti)i2I =CLTj if j 2 I, otherwise #. We can now dene terms that mirror abstractions asfollows.Denition 16 1. hXi 7!xiii2I:Xj =df xj , if j 2 I;2. :T =df K(T ), if dm() \ FP (T ) = ;;3. :(T (xi:Ti)i2I) =df S(:T )(xi::Ti)i2I ,if 2 doesn't apply.Lemma 20 k:Tkg  f = kTkgdmf .Lemma 21 X 2 dm() ) X 62 FP (:T ).Let applicative structures hD?; i be dened like CAL-algebras withoutmentioning s or any kx, and V range over terms not containing S and the Kx. Icall such expressions pure terms.Denition 17 An applicative structure is combinatorially complete if forany pure term V and 1 : : : n with FP (V )  Si=1::n dm(i), there is a d 2 D?such that for all f1 : : :fn and arbitrary g:d  f1  : : :  fn = kV kgdm1f11 :::dmnfnn :Theorem 22 Every CAL-algebra is combinatorially complete.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 35PROOF: From the previous lemmata by taking d =df k1 : : : n:V kg. 2We now have ways to translate from AL to CAL and vice versa.Denition 18 ()CL : AL ! CAL is dened by:1. XCL =df X for all parameters;2. cCL =df c for all constants;3. (t(xi:ti)i2I )CL =df tCL(xi:(ti)CL)i2I ;4. (:t)CL =df :tCL.Denition 19 () : CAL ! AL is dened by:1. X =df X for all parameters;2. (Kx) =df hX 7!xihi:X;3. S =dfZhXi 7!xiixi2VarhYj 7!yjiyj2Var:Z(yj:Yj)yj2Var(xi:Xi(yj:Yj)yj2Var)xi2Var4. c =df c for all other constants;5. (T (xi:Ti)i2I ) =df T(xi:(Ti))i2I.Theorem 23 T =CL T 0 ) T = T 0.As in the case of the -calculus and standard CL we do not have t = t0 )tCL =CL t0CL. Given the completeness for =CL, we would therefore not havesoundness for -equality if we interpreted AL-terms naively via their CAL trans-lations. To interpret AL by means of CAL-algebras we need a canonical repre-sentative to be singled out for each representable function.Denition 20 A CAL-model is a CAL-algebra with an additional strict map such that D? *)	 ((Var!D?)! D?)rep is a retraction and 	 is representedby some e 2 D?.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 36Theorem 24 For any CAL-model there is a unique, well-dened interpretationfunction k  k : AL ! D? such that kckg = =(c); kXkg = g(X); kt(xi:ti)i2Ikg = 	(ktkg)(hxi 7! ktikgii2I); k:tkg =  fktkgdm()f .PROOF: We show by induction on t that the following hold simultaneously:1. ktkg is well-dened for all g;2. ktkg = ktkgXd if X 62 FP (t);3. For all 1 : : : n with FP (t)  Si=1::n dm(i), there is a d 2 D? such thatfor all f1 : : :fn and arbitrary g:d  f1  : : :  fn = ktkgdm1f11 :::dmnfnn : For pure terms, in particular for constants and parameters, 1 3 are trivial,or follow from combinatory completeness. For applications t(xi:ti)i2I 1 and 2 are trivial. Let dt and dti satisfy 3 fort and the ti. By the previous item the following object b exists, where wewrite  for ((X):X)X2dm and require that rng(i) = Var and dm(i) \dm(j) = ; for i 6= j = 1::n and the Xi are fresh as well:b =df kY hXi 7!xiii2I1 : : :n:Y 1 : : : n(xi:Xi 1 : : : n))kh:Then d = b  dt  hxi 7! dtiii2I satises 3. For abstractions :t let dt fulll 3 for t and 1 : : : n; , and let fi(x) =g( 1i (x)) for i = 1::n. Thena =df dt  f1  : : :  fn
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 37represents fktkgdm()f . Hence e  a = k:tkg. This proves 1 and 2. For 3let 1 : : : n be as above and X; Y fresh. Letb =df kXY 1 : : : n:X(Y 1 : : : n)k  e  dtHence b  f1  : : :  fn = e  (dt  f1  : : :  fn) = k:tkgdm1f11 :::dmnfnn . 22.3.3 Completeness for ALWe write Ax j=CLM t = t0 if ktkg = kt0kg in every CAL-model that satises all theequations in Ax.Theorem 25 (Soundness) Ax ` t = t0 ) Ax j=CLM t = t0:Denition 21 Let [t] =df ft0jAx ` t = t0g. We dene the AL-term modelfor Ax T(Ax) by D? =df f[t]jt 2 ALg, ? =df [#], =(c) =df [c] for all constants,and 	([t])(hxi 7! tiii2I) =df [t(xi:ti)i2I]; s =df [S]; kx =df [(Kx)] for all x 2 Var; e =df [ZhXi 7!xiixi2Var:Z(xi:Xi)xi2Var]; (f ) =df e  [t], if [t] represents f .Lemma 26 T(Ax) is a CAL-model satisfying Ax.PROOF: By A2 and R3 the operation 	, and thus , is well-dened forT(Ax).  is also well-dened: let [t] and [t'] both represent f , then Ax `t(xi:Xi)xi2Var = t0(xi:Xi)xi2Var, hence by R4 Ax ` hXi 7!xiixi2Var:t(xi:Xi)xi2Var =hXi 7!xiixi2Var:t0(xi:Xi)xi2Var, and therefore e  [t] = e  [t0].We need to check the axioms for CAL-algebras.
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 381. kxk  hxi 7! [ti]ii2I  hyj 7! [t0j]ij2J = [(Kxk)(xi:ti)i2I (yj:t0j)j2J ] = [tk]if k 2 I, else [#], whence = hxi 7! [ti]ii2I(xk).2. s  hxi 7! [ti]ii2I  hyj 7! [t0j]ij2J  hvk 7! [t00k]ik2K= [S(xi:ti)i2I (yj:t0j)j2J (vk:t00k)k2K]= [ti(vk:t00k)k2K(yj:t0j(vk:t00k)k2K)j2J ], if z = xi for some i 2 I,otherwise # and thus= hxi 7! [ti]ii2I(z)  hvk 7! [t00k]ik2K  hyj 7! [t0j]  hvk 7! [t00k]ik2Kij2J.3. [#]  hxi 7! [ti]ii2I = [#(xi:ti)i2I] = [#].The equations in Ax obviously hold. For the additional conditions on CAL-models we have by denition that 	 is represented by e. For strictness of  wenotice that [#] represents ?(Var!D)!D by item 3 above. Hence (?(Var!D)!D) =e  ?(Var!D)!D = [hXi 7!xiixi2Var:#(xi:Xi)xi2Var] = [#] by A6 and A7.What remains to be checked is the retraction condition that 	 (f ) = f forall f : ((Var!D?)! D?)rep. So if  = 	[t] then for all hxi 7! [ti]ii2I:	  ()(hxi 7! [ti]ii2I) = 	( 	[t])(hxi 7! [ti]ii2I) = e  [t]  hxi 7! [ti]ii2I= [t(xi:ti)i2I] = 	[t](hxi 7! [ti]ii2I) = (hxi 7! [ti]ii2I). 2Lemma 27 ktkg = [[tj=Xj]j2Jt] in T(Ax), where g(Xj) = [tj] for j 2 J.PROOF: kckg = [c] and kXikg = [ti] by denition. By induction kt(xi:ti)i2Ikg = ktkghxi 7! ktikgii2I = [[tj=Xj]j2Jt]hxi 7! [[tj=Xj]j2Jti]ii2I= [[tj=Xj]j2J t(xi:ti)i2I ]; For any f choose sfj such that [sfj ] = f  (Xj) for those j 2 J 0  J forwhich (Xj) is dened. The choice is arbitrary by the rules R3 and R4.Also by axiom A4 we may assume that dm()\Sj2JnJ 0 FP (tj ) = ; and noXi gets accidentally bound in the application of e. Thenk:tkg =  fktkgdm()f =  f [[sfj=Xj]j2J 0[tj=Xj]j2JnJ 0 t]=  (	[:[tj=Xj]j2JnJ 0 t]) = e  [:[tj=Xj]j2JnJ 0t]= [hXi 7!xiixi2Var:(:[tj=Xj]j2JnJ 0t)(xi:Xi)xi2Var]= [hXi 7!xiixi2Var:[Xi= 1(xi)]xi2rng()[tj=Xj]j2JnJ 0 t]= [:[tj=Xj]j2JnJ 0 t] = [[tj=Xj]j2J:t]. 2
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 39Theorem 28 (Completeness) Ax j=CLM t = t0 ) Ax ` t = t0:PROOF: If Ax 6` t = t0 then [t] 6= [t0] in T(Ax) and thus ktkg 6= kt0kg,setting g(X) = [X] for all X 2 Par. Therfore Ax 6j=CLM t = t0. 2Corollary 29 The nitary -calculus is complete for nitary AL.PROOF: If j=CLM t = t0 then ` t = t0, and hence by Church-Rosser ts^t0sfor some s. But reduction of nite terms cannot produce innite terms. Thus,there is a proof of t = t0, by nal application of R1 and R2, which involves noinnite terms. 22.4 Structured Objects and Systems of Equa-tionsStructured objects are distinguished from ordinary objects in that they can beuniquely decomposed into the component parts, from which they were put to-gether. Ordered pairs are typical examples, forming an object ha; bi from twoobjects a; b, such that there are projection functions 1; 2 with 1(ha; bi) = aand 2(ha; bi) = b. The denition of ordered pairs in the -calculus will be gen-eralised for our purposes here. I use the following operation, which allows us tobuild structured objects with any number of components.hh(xi:t1i )i2I1; : : : ; (xi:tni )i2Inii =df y: (y(xi:t1i )i2I1:::(xi:tni )i2In) (y fresh):Theorem 30 hh(xi:t1i )i2I1; : : : ; (xi:tni )i2Inii = hh(xi:s1i )i2I1; : : : ; (xi:sni )i2Inii! Vk=1::n Vi2Ik tki = ski :PROOF: The xi-component of the kth member is recovered by the projectionn;kxi = y: y(fg1 : : :fgk 1fxigfgk+1 : : :fgn: xi): 2
CHAPTER 2. SIMULTANEOUS ABSTRACTION 40For ordered n-tuples we write hh:::; t; :::ii for hh:::; (z:t); :::ii, where z is as usualthe designated role to encode unary abstraction/application. By n = 1 one canencode assignments, which we write as hhxi:tiiii2I. The values of an encodedassignment are retrieved by projection functions xi =df y:y(fxigxi). We havexi(hhxj:tjiij2J) = ti for i 2 J:Notice that for any x 6= y, if x = y then for all t; t0 : t = x(hhx:t; y:t0ii)= y(hhx:t; y:t0ii) = t0. Hence, in a non trivial model all projections x must bedierent. We conclude:14Theorem 31 Any non trivial SAC-model is innite.A particular demand of ST, at the focus of [Aczel & Lunnon 1991], is tohave non well-founded objects, obtained from cyclic sets of equations.15 To solvesystems of equations (xi = ti)i2I we use the above encoding of assignments. Wesay that an (encoded) assignment a solves a system of equations (xi = ti)i2Ii for all i 2 I xi(a) = [xj(a)=xj ]j2Iti.Theorem 32 Every system of equations has a solution.PROOF: Recall that  =df f: (x:f (xx))(x:f (xx)) is a xed point combinatorwith t(t) = (t) for any term t. Dene from a system of equations (xi = ti)i2Ithe functor F =df z:hhxi:[xj(z)=xj]j2Itiiii2I. Then (F ) solves the system, asxi(F ) = xi(F (F )) = xihhxi:[xj(F )=xj ]j2Itiiii2I= [xj(F )=xj ]j2Iti. 2As things stand we do not necessarily have unique solutions to such equations.It may be consistent to assume uniqueness at least for some kinds of systems, toget closer to the original aims of Aczel and Lunnon.14Notice that this holds for nitary versions of the SAC as well.15An example of a cyclic equation would be x = hhx; cii, any solution of which must providea non well-founded pair p whose rst component is p itself.In the following, we need to assume that at least three variables do not occur in such asystem, to allow us to form the terms below without accidentally binding some of the xi inthem.
Chapter 3Semantic TheoriesI now show how the SAC can provide a framework for specifying semantic theo-ries, especially recent ones, which do not easily t into the traditional -calculus.Perhaps the key idea for semantics, as conceived of in this thesis, is to thinkof properties as functions from assignments to propositions. I will use the term!-properties to distinguish them from ordinary functions which take entities intopropositions.In the following I will freely mix the languages AL, , and , accordingto whatever notation seems most convenient. The reader is expected to switchbetween the systems according to the translations given in section 2.2.1, thoughit will not be necessary to mentally translate every term into AL, I hope. To thecontrary, the use of  and  should help to avoid tedious complications, whichare the price we pay for AL's simple proof theory.The following section on Frege Structures will be presupposed in all threesemantic theories to be discussed, but otherwise those sections can be read rela-tively independently.3.1 Frege StructuresFor semantics, as I understand it, we need a theory of truth for the propositionsthat we hope to denote by our terms. The usual way to approach such a theoryis to give an inductive denition of truth-in-a-model for terms of the right type,41
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 42where the notion of a model is suitably enriched to x the base cases. In ILand similar systems for example we nd a basic type of truth values (usuallytwo), and the theory of truth is given as conditions that determine which truthvalue is denoted by a complex formula, depending on its parts. The matter iscomplicated by the presence of a number of parameters with respect to which aformula is evaluated, most prominently an index for possible worlds. The wholesetup leans towards building theoretic assumptions into the system via modelingchoices and implicit consequences of certain denitions, rather than taking thingsat face value and saying explicitly what we assume to hold about them.My aim here is to provide a exible framework in which dierent semanticassumptions can be expressed and tried out. It is thus a good idea to lookelsewhere, namely to Property Theories, for ways to avoid prejudging too manyissues before we can even begin to put any of the ideas we have produced intopractise. The kinds of things I want to assume for the envisaged framework arethese: some terms denote propositions, and propositions are the things that aretrue or false. 
-properties are things that form propositions when applied toassignments of objects to certain variables, which we think of as argument rolesfor those !-properties. The notion of truth does not primarily apply to formalexpressions, in relation to various parameters of evaluation, but to propositions,which are things that need no further xing of any such parameters. This doesnot prevent us from introducing such parameters into our framework, but ratherallows us to do so without changing the theory of truth: if an expression has tobe evaluated with respect to certain entities, worlds, situations, time intervalsetc., it simply does not express a proposition, but an incomplete object, whichneeds some open argument places lled.I do not claim that this approach is the only possible way of making use ofthe theory of simultaneous abstraction developed in the preceding chapter, butmerely that this way of proceeding delivers reasonable versions of (the underlyinglogics of) DMG, DRT and ST in a simple, economical, and philosophically soundway. The addition of new structure in this framework, such as for example atheory of situations and states of aairs into a Montagovian or Kamp style se-mantics, does not require us to revise the basic axioms of truth for DMG or DRT,which in turn are perfectly compatible extensions of the theory of Proposition
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 43Structures. What has to be revised in switching from one system to another areaxioms about the lexical meaning of words, and possibly other aspects of thesyntax{semantics interface, but not the fundamental apparatus of abstraction,application, propositions, and truth.Let me then introduce a formal rst order language in which to state sucha theory of truth. One might do the job in an informal model theoretic wayalong the lines of [Aczel 1980] but I will make things look more like the formaltreatment of [Turner 1990], without attaching any philosophical importance tothis.1 In line with our convention to use AL as our ocial term language I regardits parameters as variables v; v1; v2::: of FOLSAC , dened below.2Denition 22 We dene WFFs of FOLSAC over a set of n-ary predicates Rni : if t1; : : : ; tn; t; t0 2 AL then Rni (t1; :::; tn); t = t0 2 WFF , if  ;  2WFF then :; ^  ;9v 2 WFF .Other connectives and quantiers are dened as usual. A model M forFOLSAC is a CAL-model with an interpretation = for the predicates, such thatthe usual conditions obtain: M; g j= Rni (t1; :::; tn) i hkt1kg; :::; ktnkgi 2 =(Rni ); M; g j= t = t0 i ktkg = kt0kg; M; g j=  ^  i M; g j=  and M; g j=  ; M; g j= : i M; g 6j= ; M; g j= 9v i 9d 2 D? : M; gvd j= .1It has technical advantages though, as this allows us to use FOL's well understood prooftheory to show that a (nite) term t implies another (nite) term t0, relative to a particulartheory of truth. For this, one would have to derive T (t0) in FOL from T (t) plus the axioms oftruth and (-) identity. It seems possible to provide a completeness theorem for this.2If we were to stick to -terms here it would be useful to add to the -variables a set ofvariables that do not enter into the formation of complex terms, in order to always have freshones when needed.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 44We single out a unary relation T as a truth predicate. We dene F (t) =dfT ( t) (falsity) and P (t) =df T (t) _ F (t) (being a proposition). For dealing withquantication we dene PTY n(t) =df 8v1 : : : vn P (t(v1) : : : (vn)) (being an n-placeproperty).Logical operations in our calculus are treated as AL-constants whose seman-tic behavior is captured by a theory of truth.3 The following logical constants aresingled out: \;[; ;;;;;, intended to be the operations of conjunc-tion, disjunction, negation, implication, existential and universal quantication,equality, and structured predication4 . I will take \; ;;; as primitive, andthe others to be dened in terms of these.5 I assume the logical combinators,other than , to have one or two distinguished argument roles z1; z2. One canof course curry them for standard Montagovian techniques to run smoothly.6 Inany case I write them in the conventional form, t \ t0 for \(z1:t; z2:t0), x t for(z1:x:t) etc. and (xi:ti)i2It for (z1:t)(xi:ti)i2I , to enhance readability.Denition 23 1. A Proposition Structure is a model of FOLSAC sat-isfying P (t  t0) ^ (T (t  t0) $ t = t0 )P (t) ! (P ( t) ^ (T ( t) $ :T (t) ))P (t) ^ P (t0) ! (P (t \ t0) ^ (T (t \ t0)$ T (t) ^ T (t0) )).2. A Proposition Structure with Predication has the additional truth{axiomP (t(xi:ti)i2I ) ! (P ((xi:ti)i2It) ^ (T ((xi:ti)i2It)$ T (t(xi:ti)i2I ) ))3These constants are not to be confused with the logical symbols of FOLSAC , which we useto express our theories of truth.4The SAC, in contrast to Aczel and Lunnon's theory, does not take the idea of structuredobjects as a starting point. I take the notions of abstraction and application as fundamentalhere, rather than structure preserving predication. It is crucial that these two notions of appli-cation/predication are kept distinct. Occasionally, forms of Situation Theory have been guiltyof conating them, when they assumed \infons" to be composed out of a unique relation andassignment, plus relations to be infon-abstracts which apply to assignments to form structuredinfons. This implies that r(xi:ti)i2I = (xi:ti)i2Ir for all relations r, which quickly leads tothe triviality of the model, by the argument given in [Aczel 1989].5There may be reasons not to do this, such as to avoid unintended identities in attitudecontexts, or to be able to use the less symmetric notion of \strong" implication in [Aczel 1980].6Avoiding all forms of currying is useful if the predication axiom is to be fully exploited.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 45plus the axiom of structure preservation((xi:ti)i2It) = ((xi:t0i)i2It0) ! t = t0 ^ ^i2I ti = t0i :3. A Frege Structure7 is a Proposition Structure satisfyingPTY 1(t) ! (P (t) ^ (T (t) $ 9v T (t(v)) )):4. I speak of a strong Proposition / Frege Structure (with predication) ifwe have biconditionals for propositionhood, that is P (t) $ P ( t), P (t) ^P (t0) $ P (t\ t0), P (t(xi:ti)i2I )$ P ((xi:ti)i2It), and PTY 1(t) $ P ( t).The class of propositions guaranteed to exist by these axioms is rather re-stricted, in that the relations which have an internal representation by someproperty only involve equality and logical constants. In semantic applicationsone needs a much larger stock of basic properties. So it is useful to considerthe addition of further predicates to FOLSAC , whose extensions may be xed inarbitrary ways. The question arises whether these extensions also correspond toproperties that are internally represented in the Frege Structure, and thus aredenotable by a (possibly newly introduced) term.Denition 24 A term t internally defines a predicate v1;:::;vn, with freevariables v1; :::; vn 62 FV (t), in some FOLSAC -model, if:PTY n(t) ^ 8v1::vn T (tv1::vn)$ v1::vn:We may apply this terminology to denotations as well, and say in such casesthat a particular relation is internally dened by an n-place property. As Aczelpointed out in [Aczel 1980] there are limits to what can be internally dened in7For simplicity, I leave out the axiom for strong implication: (T (t) ! P (t0)) ! P (t t0) ^ T (t t0) $ (T (t) ! T (t0)) which may have a useful role to play: it allows us to formuniversally quantied propositions v(F (v)G(v)) even when F and G are not properties, aslong as for all d for which F (d) is true, G(d) is a proposition.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 46a Proposition Structure. For example the truth predicate T cannot be internallydened, for it would lead to the construction of a liar proposition.83.1.1 ConsistencyI more or less repeat the proof of the existence of Frege Structures from [Aczel 1980]here, in a somewhat sketchy manner.Take any non-trivial model for the SAC. To get a model for our axioms we needa set T that interprets T , such that the axioms are true. The other predicates,like P; F; ::: are dened in terms of T , but it is more convenient to work withpairs (P; T ) of subsets T  P, called propositions and truths, to interpretP and T . Such pairs of subsets form a cpo as follows, where F =df P nT are thefalsities: (P; T ) v (P 0; T 0) , T  T 0 and F  F 0:Lub's of ascending chains are given by set union. Any monotone operator over acpo has a least xed point. We dene a monotone operator F whose xed pointsgive us FOLSAC -models for the Frege Structure axioms when =(T ) = T .As any non-trivial model is innite we can select for each logical constant lsemantically distinct terms rl such that we can use structured objects to avoidpossible overlaps between the results of applying dierent logical constants.9 Forbinary l we assign the following interpretation:dl =df kfz1; z2g:hhrl; z1; z2iikg:Similarly for unary ones. Predication is encoded asd =df Zhxi 7!Xiixi2Var:hhr;Z; (xi:Xi)xi2Varii8Let l be a term that solves the equation x =  true(x), and assume that true internallydenes T . Then P (l), and hence T (l) $ T ( true(l)) $ :T (true(l)) $ :T (l), which is acontradiction.9The proof thus would not work for theories that explicitly deny their propositions to bethis highly structured.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 47Let dl;f;h stand for dl  f  h if l = , otherwise dl  f . The truth{axiomAxl for a logical operator dl can be expressed semantically with reference to aproposition condition PCl(P; f; h) and a truth condition TCl(T ; f; h) as(Axl) PCl(P; f; h)) (dl;f;h 2 P and ( dl;f;h 2 T , TCl(T ; f; h) ))For example, the proposition condition for \ is `f (z1) 2 P and f (z2) 2 P', andthe truth condition for   is `f (z1) 62 T '.Denition 25 F (P; T ) =df (P 0; T 0), where for the logical constants l of FregeStructures: P 0 is the smallest set such that for each l; f; h:PCl(P; f; h) ) dl;f;h 2 P 0; T 0 is the smallest set such that for each l; f; h:PCl(P; f; h) and TCl(T ; f; h) ) dl;f;h 2 T 0.Lemma 33 Any xed point for F satises AxF .PROOF: Let F (P; T ) = (P; T ).(i) If PCl(P; f; h) then dl;f;h 2 P .(ii) If PCl(P; f; h) and TCl(T ; f; h) then dl;f;h 2 T .(iii) Given PCl(P; f; h) and dl;f;h 2 T there are l0; f 0; h0 with dl;f;h = dl0;f 0;h0 andTC 0l(T ; f 0; h0). But then rl = rl0 and f = f 0, and in case l =  also h = h0, andhence TCl(T ; f; h). 2By the fact that Ax  is satised we see that P is the extension of the predicateP as it was dened, and thus the axioms AxF hold if and only if the formal axiomsfor Frege Structures are true. Notice that the reverse direction of (i) is true aswell, giving us in fact a strong Frege Structure. The fact that predication isstructure preserving is obvious. So we conclude:Theorem 34 Every non trivial SAC-model can be extended to a strong FregeStructure with Predication.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 48As Aczel has shown in [Aczel 1980], it is consistent to add innitely manyaxioms for the internal denition of relations to the theory of Frege Structures,as long as the extensions of the possibly newly introduced predicates v1:::vn in theSAC-model are given in advance, without reference to T . In the construction ofthe Frege Structures they are treated just as we treated identity, which is alreadyinternally dened.Theorem 35 Every non trivial SAC-model can be extended to a strong FregeStructure with Predication in which a countable number of previously given rela-tions are internally dened by n-place properties.3.2 Dynamic Montague GrammarThere are several versions of DMG on the market, which use dierent \dynamic"relatives of Montagues original logic IL. One such logic, namely the DynamicProperty Theory (DPT) of [Chierchia 1994], is particularly close to the system of the preceding chapter. The additions we have to make to obtain DPT arevery small indeed, as  was rst developed as a generalisation of DPTs limitedmeans of simultaneous abstraction and application.In DPT, the variables are divided into two kinds: the discourse markersDM , and the remaining ones, which I call meta variables MV . I use Greekletters ;  : : : for meta variables, dotted letters _x; _y : : : for discourse markers,and x; y : : : for variables that can be of either kind. The sorting of the variablesis not a matter of the kinds of denotations they take. It is rather a matter ofgetting the two crucial operators of the system, u-abstraction and t-application,to operate on a certain set of variables, namely the discourse markers, only. Weneed to protect the other variables, i.e. the meta variables, from the inuence ofu-abstraction so that we can bind variables inside the scope of u, as will becomeevident from the examples later on.The \dynamic" part of DMG can be captured easily by abstracting and ap-plying to the innite set of discourse markers via the following denitions:
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 49 ut =df DM:t, and tt =df t( _x: _x) _x2DM .All other abstractions and applications will be the traditional unary ones.10We use them to get a fairly standard system that does not require us to rethinkthe setup of DMG. Let me call DPT-terms any expressions built from unaryabstraction and application and the t and u operators.Convenient as DPT-terms may be for the purposes of DMG, one would expectthem to make trouble in the proof theory, given the inconveniences of  in thatrespect. On the positive side, notice that every discourse marker is bound ina term of the form ut, and occurs free in tt. We thus can -convert a term:t ( ut0) even if some discourse markers of t0 end up in the scope of an abstractionin t. Discourse markers are not free in ut0 and hence do not become bound bya new operator inside t. Another reduction we use in DMG beside the morestandard -conversions is t ut = t.On the negative side, there are DPT-terms which cannot be reduced to sim-pler DPT-expressions, although their translations into AL may be contractableinto new AL-terms which are not translations of any DPT expressions. Anexample would be a term (: u)( _x) which translates to (hz 7! zih _xz 7!_xi _x2DM :z)(z: _xz). As a DPT-term (: u)( _x) is not reducible. In particularit is not semantically equivalent to u _x, which means the same thing as the -term f _xg: _x. The translated term on the other hand boils down to [ _xz=z]h _xz 7!_xi _x2DM :z  hi: _xz, which is the translation of the -term fg: _x, but not of anyDPT expression. Luckily the terms actually used in DMG do not belong to theproblematic sort. I will think of DPT-expressions as convenient shorthands forthe underlying AL-terms, for which I have already given a complete proof theoryin 2.2.2, and a calculus for DPT as being obtained via the standard translationgiven in section 2.2.1. For computational applications this stance is of courseimpractical, as the terms involving t and u will be innite, and thus in real lifesomething closer to actual DPT-expressions will have to be used. But for an10As an alternative to taking these unary operations as dened in terms of AL- or 0-expressions, one could introduce them as basic operations, and give them a semantics in anexpanded domain D *)	 ((Var ! D)! D) + (D ! D), in the way [Chierchia 1994] does.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 50understanding of how these expressions have to be handled the translation intoAL still is instructive.The sentence `A man walks in' can now be rendered in our notation as: _x(man( _x) \walkin( _x) \ t)which can applied to uwhistle( _x) (`he whistles') to yield _x(man( _x) \walkin( _x) \whistle( _x))The important action happens at the level of conjunction of !-properties,which is achieved by abstracting over \possible continuations" of the discourse.113.2.1 Some DMG TranslationsI only give a short sketch here and refer the reader to [Chierchia 1994] and[Chierchia 1992] for a more complete treatment. Sentence denotations in DMGare not propositions, but context change potentials (ccp's), where a ccp is a func-tion from !-properties to propositions. As a notational convention I write utas dte. Two operations are handy to convert propositions into ccp's and back:" t =df (t \ t) and # t =df tdtruee. I assume the scope of operators to benarrowest for t, and increasingly wider for application (bracketing to the left),\,  , [, ", #, and unary -abstraction.Ccp's allow for clever ways of leaving holes within quantied structures to belled by later material in the discourse so that one can use functional compositiont; t0 =df :tdt0()e for discourse sequencing:` _x[a man] walks in. _x[he] whistles.'=)( _x(man( _x) \walkin( _x) \ t)) ; (: whistle( _x) \ t)= ( _x man( _x) \walkin( _x) \whistle( _x) \ t)11Lambda conversion on uwhistle( _x) is only one way to make the conjunction happen. Uni-cation of whistle( _x) with the unabstracted variable , as in UCG, see [Zeevat 1991], is just asintuitive for this. Hence the choice of the term `meta variables', reminiscent of its use in UCG.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 51The exibility of ccp's is shown by various possibilities to dene dynamic kindsof universal quantication for donkey sentences. Here is an example derivation ofthe \strong" reading for them. To make things concrete I use a basic, purely ap-plicative Categorial Grammar, operating on sequents   =) A : t, of sequences  of (indexed) strings, and category{meaning pairs A : t. We have lexical axioms,plus the slash elimination rules (=E) and (nE),12 interpreted by \intensional"function application.(=E) if  1 =) A=B : t1 and  2 =) B : t2 then  1 2 =) A : t1dt2e(nE) if  1 =) B : t1 and  2 =) BnA : t2 then  1 2 =) A : t2dt1e` _x[every]' =) (s=(nns))=cn : : "_x  (( t _x) d  # ( t _x)e)`man' =) cn : x: "man(x)`with' =) (cnncn)=(s=(nns)) : : ( t ) d t dy "with(; y)e ()e` _y[a]' =) (s=(nns))=cn : : _y (( t _y)d t _ye)`donkey' =) cn : x: "donkey(x)`beats' =) (nns)=(s=(nns)) : : t dy "beat(; y)e` _y[it]' =) (s=(nns)) : : t _y` _y[a] donkey' =) s=(nns) :: _y (( tdx "donkey(x)e _y)d t _ye): _y (("donkey( _y))d t _ye): _y (donkey( _y) \ t _y)`with _y[a] donkey' =) cnncn ::( t ) d td  _y (donkey( _y) \ t _y)e dy "with(; y)e ()e12For a full Lambek calculus we need to be able to \hypothesise" constituents of anydescription. This can be achieved by adding axioms, slash introduction rules, and Cut:(Ax) A : t =) A : t(=I) if  ; B : t =) A : t then   =) A=B : :t(nI) if B : t;   =) A : t then   =) BnA : :t(Cut) if  1; A2 : t2; 3 =) A1 : t1 and  2 =) A2 : t2 then  1 2 3 =) A1 : t1where  is not free in  . The lexical translations would have to be spiced with a stronger doseof t-s, to make this work correctly.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 52:( t ) d _y (donkey( _y) \ ( tdy "with(; y)e _y))e:( t ) d _y (donkey( _y) \ ("with(; _y))())e:( t ) d _y (donkey( _y) \with(; _y) \ t)e`man with _y[a] donkey' =) cn ::( tdx "man(x)e ()) d _y (donkey( _y) \with(; _y) \ t)e:("man()) d _y (donkey( _y) \with(; _y) \ t)e:(man() \ _y(donkey( _y) \ with(; _y) \ t))` _x[every] man with _y[a] donkey' =) s=(nns) ::"_x  ( td(man() \ _y(donkey( _y) \with(; _y)\ t))e( _x)d # ( t _x)e):"_x  (man( _x) \ _y(donkey( _y) \ with( _x; _y) \ td  # ( t _x)e)):"_x  (man( _x) \ _y(donkey( _y) \ with( _x; _y) \  # ( t _x)))`beats _y[it]' =) nns :: td ( t _y)e dy "beat(; y)e:( tdy "beat(; y)e ( _y)): "beat(; _y)` _x[every] man with _y[a] donkey beats _y[it] ' =) s :"_x  (man( _x) \ _y(donkey( _y) \ with( _x; _y) \  # ( td "beat(; _y)e ( _x))))"_x  (man( _x) \ _y(donkey( _y) \ with( _x; _y) \  #"beat( _x; _y)))"_x  (man( _x) \ _y(donkey( _y) \ with( _x; _y) \ (beat( _x; _y) \ true)))An alternative to the above \strong" reading of the universal, would assignthe translation:` _x[every]' =) : "_x # ( t _x) [ ( t _x)d# ( t _x)eresulting in the \weak" reading:"_x   (man( _x) \ _y(donkey( _y) \with( _x; _y) \ true))[ (man( _x) \ _y(donkey( _y) \ with( _x; _y) \ beat( _x; _y) \ true))
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 533.3 Discourse Representation TheoryThe SAC mirrors very closely the use of discourse referents in DRSs. The systemI present in this section is inspired Robin Cooper's Situation Theoretic DRT,[Cooper 1993], where he uses EKN with Aczel{Lunnon abstraction to similar ef-fect. As in Cooper's treatment, this version of DRT is not quite faithful to stan-dard versions, as it imposes a need for some additional abstractions at the rightlevel. This is because only abstracted variables are linked to their antecedents,while free variables cannot in this system be \captured" in the way one has cometo expect. I won't go into the resulting complications for the syntax{semanticsinterface here, as I will explore alternatives which use free variables more promi-nently in the next chapter.3.3.1 Zeevat's DRTFirst, let me briey sketch Henk Zeevat's compositional semantics for DRT, see[Zeevat 1989], which is an important reference point for the versions to be pre-sented in this and the next chapter.For the usual DRT syntax, we start with atomic conditions , which are justatomic rst order formulae. DRSs and complex conditions are dened recursively:DRSs are pairs hU;Ci, where U is a set of variables, and C a set of conditions; theconnective  forms implicational conditions hU;Ci  hU;Ci from two DRSs.13Atomic conditions have their expected semantics. DRSs, and complex condi-tions are treated as standardly in DRT, where gM f means g and f disagree atmost on the variables in M . kCk=df fg j 8 2 C : g 2 kkg; khU;Ci  hU 0; C 0ik =df fg j 8f f U g ^ f 2 kCk ! 9h hU 0 f ^ h 2kC 0kg;13I will ignore negation here.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 54 hU;Ci is true under g idf 9f fU g ^ f 2 kCk.To this system Zeevat adds a syntactic operation 
, for \merging" two DRSsinto one: () hU;Ci
 hU 0; C 0i =df hU [ U 0; C [C 0i:DRSs are given a denotation in terms of pairs,khU;Cik=df hU; kCkiwhose rst and second component are notated as ktk1 and ktk2 respectively. Hehas shown that this makes k  k a homomorphism between the syntactic and thesemantic algebra of DRSs. In particular, with respect to 
 we have:() khU;Ci
 hU 0; C 0ik = hkhU;Cik1[ khU 0; C 0ik1; khU;Cik2 \ khU 0; C 0ik2i:Notice that there is no unique decomposition of DRSs with respect to 
. Ina more \linear" format, similar to Zeevat's BL,14 one can have expressions of theform DRS1 
 DRS2, which mention 
 explicitly and thus uniquely decomposealong this operation. The fact () then inductively denes the denotation ofsuch DRSs. My systems will operate along the latter lines. Given such a syntax,interpreted by (), we get the following \merging principle" to hold:(MP ) khU;Ci
 hU 0; C 0ik = khU [ U 0; C [C 0ik;which semantically reects Zeevat's earlier syntactic denition in ().Let me try to bridge the gap to our framework a bit further. Syntactically,sets of conditions may be replaced by conjunctions. Semantically, the sets ofassignments kCk can be turned into functions from assignments to truth, andner grained propositions should be put in the place of truth values in order toget closer to our highly intensional approach.There is of course an obvious dierence to be observed. The SAC has an ab-straction operation, which gives us terms U:C 0 rather than pairs hU;Ci, denoting14See section 1.3, in [Zeevat 1989].
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 55functions (under assignments), rather than pairs. In contrast to DRS formation,we can iterate abstractions indenitely, and we have a simple notion of applica-tion at our disposal. The downside is a certain loss of structure, to be faced in theSAC, as the denotation kU:Ck may be identical to kU 0:Ck, although U 6= U 0.There is no way of recovering the set of variables U that was abstracted overfrom the denotation of a term, while it can be read o from Zeevat's khU;Cikas the rst component. This fact allows him to generate the correct interpreta-tions for  and 
 in a compositional way. Thus, we have to nd other ways tosemantically identify certain sets of variables as the universes in the denotationsof DRSs, or we need to introduce more structure of the suitable kind into thesemantics for our calculus. I explore the rst option here, using a suitable notionof !-properties. In the next chapter I pursue the route of changing the semanticsof the SAC itself, towards a more ne grained meaning for abstraction, whichdraws on Zeevat's idea even more. The resulting system of -DRT does seem tobe suciently attractive to justify such a move.3.3.2 !-PropertiesLet us regard the universe of a DRS as the set of argument roles of an !-property.We start by dening a propositional function in the argument roles x1 : : :xn asfollows:PF fx1::xng(t) =df 8v1::vn ^i=1::nvi 6= # ! P (t(x1:v1; : : : ; xn:vn)) (vi fresh):This is not a suciently strict notion of !-properties to render Kamp Struc-tures consistent. We need a notion of PTYM such that the set of argument rolesM is uniquely determined for any given !-property. The predicate PFM doesnot possess this property as abstracts are insensitive to overdened assignments:j= fx1::xngt (x1:t1; ::; xn:tn) = fx1::xngt (x1:t1; ::; xn+m:tn+m):How strict a notion of !-property one ultimately wants remains to be seen.For now I take it to imply that the set of argument roles M of an !-property isthe smallest set of roles in which it is a propositional function, and that it is a
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 56propositional function in every set of roles containing M .Denition 26 We dene the notion of !-property in the argument rolesM by:15 PTY M (t) =df ^MN PFN (t) ^ ^M 6N :PFN(t):We introduce a new notion of internal representation of relations, which re-ects the denedness requirements for the argument roles of !-properties. Arelation  is internally defined by the !-property t if for some x1; : : : ; xn:PTY fx1::xng(t) ^ 8v1::vn ^i=1::nvi 6= # ! T (t(x1:v1; ::; xn:vn)$ v1::vn:3.3.3 Kamp StructuresLet us now try to give a theory of !-properties and propositions and truth that iscapable of dealing with basic ideas of DRT. We add to the basic logical operations\; ; a new quanticational operator, the binary conditional .Denition 27 A Kamp Structure is a Proposition Structure which satisesthe following axiom, where the vi are all fresh:PTY fxiji2Ig(t) ^ PTY fxj jj2Jg(s) ! P (t  s) ^T (t  s) $ i2I8vi 6=# T ( t (xi:vi)i2I )! j2JnI9vj 6=# T ( s (xi:vi; xj:vj)i2J\I;j2JnI )The notion of a strong Kamp Structure is as expected. Letting  =df X: (X  fg:p \  p) for some proposition p, we obtain the unselective existentialquantier that is needed to reect the truth conditions of non-embedded DRSs:PTY fx1::xng(t) ! P ( t) ^ T (t) $ 9v1::vn 6=# T (t(x1:v1; ::; xn:vn)):15I use an innitary version of FOLSAC to express this denition. This may seem unelegant,in particular as we only need nitary AL-terms for DRT. I do not regard this as problematic,as I attach no philosophical signicance to the use of a formal language in expressing the theory.The system -DRT in section 4.3 will be axiomatised informally.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 57The resulting theory is distinct from standard treatments of DRT in severalaspects, of which one appears to be somewhat worrying: in the axiom of theconditional only bound variables in s are quantied, in contrast to standard DRT.This means for example that in fx; yg:txy  fxg:sxy only the x in sxy will bebound by universal quantication, while the occurrence of y in sxy remains free,and thus unaected by . The same need to abstract over anaphoric variablesreappears when we introduce an operation of \merging" of DRSs , taken from[Cooper 1993], into the system, usually written in inx notation, where Y; Z arenot among the Xi. =df Y ZhXi 7!xiixi2Var: (Y (xi:Xi)xi2Var \ Z(xi:Xi)xi2Var):Item 3 of the following theorem approximates the \merging principle" of theprevious section. It exposes the limitations of , which in contrast to Zeevat's
 allows no capturing of free variables/parameters. Ways of overcoming thisrestriction will be discussed in the next chapter.Theorem 36 1. PTY M(t)^PTY N (t0)! PTY M[N(tt0), if the PropositionStructure is strong.2. t  t0 (x1:t1; ::; xn:tn) = t(x1:t1; ::; xn:tn) \ t0(x1:t1; ::; xn:tn).3. hXi 7!xiii2I:t hXi 7!xiii2I 0:s = hXi 7!xiii2I[I 0 : t \ s,if fXij i 2 I n I 0g \ FP (s) = fXij i 2 I 0 n Ig \ FP (t) = ;.PROOF:1. Let M [N  L, then PFL(t) and PFL(t0), hence PFL(t  t0).If M [N 6 L, e.g. by M 6 L, then :PFL(t). Hence by \ being strong:PFL(t  t0).2. By A5.3. We may assume no Xi to be vacuously bound. ThenhXi 7!xiii2I:t hXi 7!xiii2I 0:sA5 hZi 7!xiixi2Var: [Zi=Xi]i2It \ [Zi=Xi]i2I 0s
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 58A3 hZi 7!xiii2I[I 0: [Zi=Xi]xi2It \ [Zi=Xi]xi2I 0sA4 hXi 7!xiii2I[I 0: t \ s. 2Using partial application we can dene DRT-type quantiers Qx for the \du-plex conditions" of [Kamp & Reyle 1993], by means of standard generalized quan-tiers Q as relations between !-properties. The weak and strong readings areobtained as follows:thQxiwt0 =df Q(z: t[x:z] ; z: (tt0)[x:z]);thQxist0 =df Q(z: t[x:z] ; z: t[x:z] t0[x:z]):3.3.4 ConsistencyTo prove the existence of Kamp Structures we just need to check that the proofin section 3.1.2 for Frege Structures goes through for an operator K which is likeF but replaces Ax with Ax (or just adds it). The only problem in doing sostems from the quantication over sets of variables in the axiom:(Ax) 8M;N  Var : PCl(P; f; h;M;N)) (dl  f 2 P anddl  f 2 T , TCl(T ; f; h;M;N )):We thus need to adapt the denition of K to this format.Denition 28 K(P; T ) =df (P 0; T 0), where for the logical constants l of KampStructures: P 0 is the smallest set such that for each l; f; h;M;N :PCl(P; f; h;M;N ) ) dl;f;h 2 P 0; T 0 is the smallest set such that for each l; f; h;M;N :PCl(P; f; h;M;N ) and TCl(T ; f; h;M;N ) ) dl;f;h 2 T 0.Lemma 37 Any xed point for K satises Ax.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 59PROOF: Only part (iii) of the proof for Frege Structures needs to be exam-ined. The crucial fact about !-properties that we need here is that() PTYM (d) and PTYM 0(d) ) M = M 0:Let PC(P; f; h;M;N ) and d  f 2 T . Then there are l; f 0; h0;M 0; N 0 withd  f = dl;f 0;h0 such that PCl(P; f 0; h0;M 0; N 0) and TCl(T ; f 0; h0;M 0; N 0). Butthen by l =  and f = f 0 we have PC(P; f; h;M 0; N 0), which implies thatM =M 0, and N = N 0. Therefore TC(T ; f; h;M;N ). 2The other axioms are obeyed as before. Again the result of the constructionis in fact a strong Kamp Structure, as can be easily proved from ().Theorem 38 Every non-trivial SAC-model can be extended to a Kamp Structurewith Predication, where innitely many relations are internally dened by !-properties.PROOF: For each given formula v1::vn we take a semantically distinct termr, plus a term r! distinct from all rl, and variables x1; :::; xn and add the followingaxiom to the theory of Kamp Structures8v1:::vn ^i=1::nvi 6=#! P (hhr!; r; (xi:vi)i=1::nii)^(T (hhr!; r; (xi:vi)i=1::nii)$ v1::vn)Given these proposition conditions, the least xed point for K makeshhr!; r; (zj:vj)j2Jii a proposition if and only if for all j 2 J vj 6= # i zj = xi forsome i 2 f1; ::; ng. Therefore we havePTY fx1;::;xng(fx1; ::; xng:hhr!; r; (xi:xi)i=1::nii):Together with the truth conditions,  is therefore internally dened by an!-property. 2
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 603.4 Situation TheorySituation Theory is dierent from DMG and DRT in that it is not a semantictheory that by itself provides at least the outlines of a syntax{semantics inter-face. Providing such an interface for ST is the task of \Situation Semantics".16Situation Theory concentrates on the (onto)logical side of the enterprise, as I doin this thesis. It ts less well into this piece of work though, because simulta-neous abstraction is not really at the focus of ST's attention. AL is importantfor modelling forms of ST, but the central contributions of ST lie in the theoryof situations and their informational content, which has very little to do withsimultaneous abstraction.17 My aim here is not to give a denitive version of ST,but rather to show how some rather mild assumptions about the part-of structureof events18 buys us rather cheaply a fair amount of ST, if we make use of thetheory of Proposition Structures. My aim is to get a theory that is close to thatof [Barwise & Cooper 1991], but rests on rather few axiomatic assumptions overand above those already introduced in previous sections.We add to FOLSAC the predicates Sit (being a situation) and  (part of),assuming that  is a partial order on situations. It seems reasonable to assumethem to form a (complete) lattice, but I just add the weaker condition of direct-edness here. Let me use e; e0 : : : as variables for events, writing `8e : : :' instead of`8v Sit(v) ! : : :.Denition 29 the following axioms constitute our Theory of Situations:(reexivity) 8e e  e(transitivity) 8e; e0; e00 e  e0 ^ e0  e00 ! e  e00(antisymmetry) 8e; e0 e  e0 ^ e0  e! e = e0(directedness) 8e; e0 9e00 e  e00 ^ e0  e0016There are of course countless ways of going about this task, which may make use of ST tovarying degrees.17No unique, generally accepted, Situation Theory has emerged from these eorts. In[Barwise 1989] a number of \choice points" have been isolated, which provide a map for thevarious versions of ST one might encounter. I leave most of these choices open, to be xed inthe light of the semantic application or particularly strong metaphysical intuitions.18I use `event' and `situation' interchangeably.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 61I take these axioms to be fairly uncontroversial among those who believe thatevents have a role to play in semantic theories. One might want to restrict thelast axiom to events which are part of the same possible world, if one assumesthe existence of non-actual \possible situations", for it would lead to \impossiblesituations" otherwise. I will take an actualist stance here. Non-realised typesof events will hopefully compensate for the absence of other worlds, though thematter is not of central concern here.3.4.1 States of AairsTypically in Situation Theory one classies situations e by certain \states of af-fairs" (soa's)  which they \support", written e j= . Soa's have traditionallybeen taken as fundamental entities of ST, with situations being regarded as some-thing rather like sets of them. Even when situations are taken as primitives, andsupport as the ST correlate to truth, they still usually are in close correspondencewith the sets fje j= g,19 and their part-of structure is dened in terms of thesubset relation on those sets.I do not want to pursue an extreme version of ST here where all propositionsare \Austinian", that is of the form `e j= '. Given a more liberal view ofpropositions, it seems most natural to take part-of as basic, together with truth,and dene support of soa's in terms of these: soa's are persistent types of events,and a situation supporting a soa is just another case of an object having a certainproperty. This brings ST closer in line with our versions of DMG and DRT, andmakes consistency a trivial matter: Our Theory of Situations poses no particularconsistency problem, and so long as Sit and  are given in advance it is alsoconsistent for them to be internally dened in a Proposition{, Frege{, or KampStructure.A critical point for ST is the treatment of \negative soa's": there is a crucialpartiality in that a situation may fail to support a soa as well as its negation.It is tempting to try to capture this by saying that `e j= ' sometimes fails toexpress a proposition internal to the Proposition Structure, thus exploiting thetruth value gaps allowed for in that theory. But this would not lead very far as we19It is thus often assumed that fje j= g = fje0 j= g implies e = e0.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 62have no weak negation in that system: our negation only produces a truth if thenegated object is a false proposition. The system would be inconsistent if objectswithout truth value could be negated, for example to form a true proposition`e 6j= ' in cases where `e j= ' is thought of as lacking in truth value.20 Hence Ihave to insist that soa's and other types of events always yield propositions whenapplied to an event, which means that the strong, non-bivalent negation of soa'shas to be introduced by additional axioms.Denition 30 We dene Toe(t) =df 8e P (t(e)) (\t is a type of events").I use ;  0 : : : for toe's and write e j=  for T ( (e)). Soa(t) =df Toe(t) ^ 8e; e0 (e j= t ^ e  e0 ! e0 j= t) (\t is a state ofaffairs").Soa's are referred to by ; 0 : : :. Toe's can be conjoined, disjoined, andweakly negated. We dene u =df XY Z: X(Z)\ Y (Z); t =df XY Z: X(Z)[ Y (Z);  =df XZ: X(Z).Theorem 39 In every Proposition Structure obeying the Theory of Situationsholds:1. Soa() ^ Soa(0) ! Soa( u 0);2. Soa() ^ Soa(0) ! Soa( t 0);3. Toe( )! Toe(  );4. e j=  u  0 $ e j=  ^ e j=  0;5. e j=  t  0 $ e j=  _ e j=  0;6. e j=   $ e 6j=  .20This is in contrast to Muskens' work, cf. [Muskens 1989], who uses a typed logic in whichweak negation in unproblematic.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 633.4.2 Barwise StructuresWe saw above that our standard notion of negation is too weak to capture thepartiality of negation in Situation Theory. The intuition for strong negation seemsto be that a situation supports a negative fact, e j= , if some fact in e precludes from holding, and does so in a persistent way. Using strong implication and aproperty sit which internally denes the predicate Sit, one might try a denitionlike  =df X:Y sit(Y ) (Y ). But this would make negative soa's downwardpersistent, and only spuriously situated. Perhaps an internal entailment relation) between propositions, roughly similar to the \constraints" of ST, could beused, together with an internally dened , to express the above intuition as =df X:Y sit(Y ) ^X  Y )  (Y ). This would presumably be genuinelypartial and not downward persistent, but I have no results on how appropriateentailment relations could be internalized, and such a notion of negation may failto derive the full set of properties of strong negation, as they are usually assumedin ST.21Let me thus follow the standard ST account more closely, and assume we aregiven a list u1; u1; u2; u2; : : : ; un; un of symbols for basic situated relations whichapply to an assignment and a situation to form propositions.Denition 31 A Barwise Structure is a Proposition Structure satisfyingthe Theory of Situations such that for each j 2 f1:::ng there are roles fxigi2Ijsuch that i2Ij8 vi 6= #:Soa(uj(xi:vi)i2Ij ) ^ Soa(uj(xi:vi)i2Ij )8e e j= uj(xi:vi)i2Ij ! e 6j= uj(xi:vi)i2Ij9e e j= uj(xi:vi)i2Ij _ e j= uj(xi:vi)i2Ij21One may of course wonder whether these assumptions are well motivated if propositionsare taken to be more fundamental than soa's, as I am inclined to do.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 64Denition 32 We can now introduce standard notations for basic and complexnegative soa's:22 uj; (xi:ti)i2Ij ; 1 =df uj(xi:ti)i2Ij ; uj; (xi:ti)i2Ij ; 0 =df uj(xi:ti)i2Ij ; 1 u 2 =df 1 t 2; 1 t 2 =df 1 u 2;  =df .By induction on  and the directedness of  we have for all soa's :Theorem 40 9e e j=  $ 8e e 6j= .3.4.3 ConsistencyTheorem 41 Any SAC-model can be turned into a Barwise Structure.PROOF: Let Ri; Ri, for i = 1::n, be a set of ni-place relations satisfying8v2::vni 6= #: 8e; e0 Ri(e; v2; :::; vni) ^ e  e0 ! Ri(e0; v2; :::; vni); 8e; e0 Ri(e; v2; :::; vni) ^ e  e0 ! Ri(e0; v2; :::; vni); 8e (R(e; v2; :::; vni)! 8e0 :R(e0; v2; :::; vni)); 9e R(e; v2; :::; vni) _R(e; v2; :::; vni).22It would be nice to be able to show consistency for a theory that has strong negationas an internal operation, with appropriate axioms of support, rather than using the followingmetasyntactic denitions.
CHAPTER 3. SEMANTIC THEORIES 65Such relations clearly exist, and can be internally dened by ni-place propertiesti; ti. We then take ui =df fx2; ::; xnigx1: tix1:::xniui =df fx2; ::; xnigx1: tix1:::xniThe Barwise axioms are then obeyed as required. 2It is clear from the xed point construction that the additional quanticationalaxioms of Frege- and Kamp{Structures are all consistent with this theory too.So we can throw them all together without any worries.Theorem 42 Any SAC-model can be turned into a Frege-Kamp-Barwise Struc-ture with Predication. Chapter 4Further DirectionsIn this chapter I will be mainly exploring variations of the SAC that might bringit closer to more popular versions of DRT. After a look at dynamic semantics, anda typed version of the SAC, I will pursue what seems to me a rather promisingdirection of giving a slightly more structured semantics to the SAC, inspired by[Zeevat 1989]. Under this semantics the set of abstracted variables is a deningingredient to the meaning of -terms. This allows us to dene versions of theconditional, and the merge{operator, which are closer to the originals than thoseof the preceding chapter. Finally I briey discuss the notions of restriction andappropriateness, which gure prominently in [Barwise & Cooper 1991].An understanding of sections 3.1 to 3.3 will be presupposed for most of thischapter.4.1 True DynamicsThe system of DRT presented in chapter 3.3 did not use any non standardkind of binding of variables beyond the scope of an appropriate operator. Butsuch binding is prominent in so called \dynamic" forms of semantics, whichthus stand in some contrast to my approach. It is time to ask what the rela-tion is between the SAC and systems like the Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL)of [Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991], which are based on relational interpretations.DPL replaces the non-standard DRT syntax by FOL formulas, but they have66
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 67shown how to give the relational interpretation for DRSs too. Let us view rela-tions between assignments as functions from assignments to sets of assignments.Call sets of assignments !-sets, and take conditions to denote just !-sets kk.We then get the following denotation for a DRS:kfx1:::xngkgDPL = fh j g fx1::xng h ^ h 2 kkg:This should be compared with the extensions of such terms as they are in-terpreted in Kamp Structures. Let ext(d) =df fhj d  h 2 T g. We then also get!-sets as denotations under an assignment, but they are dierent from the DPLones: ext(kfx1:::xngkg) = fh j gfx1::xngh 2 ext((kk))g:The point is that the h's in our set can assign anything they like to thevariables outside fx1:::xng, while for the DPL style of denotation they have toagree with the incoming g.A natural development of DPL, carried further in [Dekker 1993], is to view\information states" as such !-sets, and then lift denotations of DRSs to functionsfrom !-sets to !-sets, such as:kkDPL"(G) = [g2GkkgDPLwhich is quite dierent from the trivial lifting from  to p:(p) that might beused in our system to make our meanings less static.The lack of a requirement for assignments to agree on certain variables hasconsequences for semantics. In contrast to DPL for example we had to abstractover variables in order to link them anaphorically to preceding discourse by ourdiscourse sequencing operation . I will discuss other kinds of sequencing, whichmay allow the capturing of free variables, in due course. What is clear though isthat relational composition, the hallmark of DPL-style dynamics, is not an optionfor SAC-style meanings. If we would use DPL style composition for discourseconjunction the referential link between identical variables could not be sustained
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 68over more than two sentences, because in the SAC any \outgoing" assignment isfree to disagree with the \incoming" one. So I opt for a version of Zeevat's mergingoperation to link anaphora to their antecedents. In contrast to composition,merging is commutative1 , thus allowing us to capture cataphora in the same way.A similar divergence between the two approaches is found in the treatment ofthe conditional. Again we had to put anaphoric variables into the abstracted setof the consequence, but only those which are anaphoric to the antecedent, notthose which refer further back.There is something of a philosophical gap between the approach of this paperand the \truly dynamic" ones, which is brought out by these considerations. Onthe SAC view the functions from assignments to !-properties are not regarded asways of \updating" information states by incoming material. It makes no senseon this view to talk of \input" and \output" in reference to the assignments. Myguiding intuition is rather that semantic objects should be plausible as things tohave attitudes towards. These objects, I take it, are rather static creatures withreference to which such notions as \information change" should be dened. Soif we are to introduce some way of capturing free variables into our system itshould be done in a way that preserves the fundamentally static view of semanticobjects that underlies the proposed framework.4.2 A Typed SystemI will sketch a typed version of the SAC here, with some operators added toformalize DRT in relatively simple, extensional fashion. The purpose is to illus-trate how a simple way of typing the SAC can work, and to provide a system ofDRT which looks more familiar to standard versions than the previous ones. Inparticular it provides a way to bind free variables outside of the scope of theirabstracted antecedents, just as it was done in traditional versions of the DRTconditional, and with Zeevats merge{operator 
, described in chapter 3.3.1. Byusing the universe of a DRS as part of the typing information we will able to prove1Strictly speaking this is only so if conjunction is commutative. Still, it's close enough forour purposes.
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 69as sound the merging principle of DRSs (MP) in full generality, which states that(MP ) j= M:t
 M 0:t0 = M[M 0:t \ t0even if some variables in M occur free in t0, or some in M 0 occur free in t. Thismeans that free variables can be captured to the left and to the right, via mergingwith DRSs in which they are abstracted over.It is clear that we cannot get the equation in full generality for , under itsoriginal interpretation, when we look at vacuous abstractions. We would needto prove for example that (fxg:true)
 (fg:F (x)) equals fxg:(true\ F (x)). Butunder the old semantics j= fxg:true = fg:true, and thus MP would imply thatfxg:(true\ F (x)) equals fg:(true\ F (x)), which is clearly not correct.It should be noted that the capturing of free variables as such is not incompat-ible with the original semantics of . One could for example capture all discoursemarkers in a merger of two terms by deningkt
 t0kg =  f ktkgDMf (f ) _^ kt0kgDMf (f )where _^ is the semantic correlate of conjunction. The problem would be that wecapture too much to validate the merging principle: if M;M 0  DM we wouldget j= M:t 
 M 0:t0 = DM:t \ t0. What we need is a semantic notion of theroles of abstracts, corresponding to the sets of their abstracted variables, here Mand M 0. This allows us to restrict our catch to M [M 0, leaving the rest free tobe caught by other abstractions. The types, with the correspondingly restricteddenotations of TDRT , provide such a notion. Another way to provide it will beexplored in due course.In order to type SAC expressions one has to build function-types that reectthe fact that terms apply to variable assignments. So on the argument side ofsuch a type we introduce an indication of what type the objects have to be thatare assigned to which variables. A set of typed variables provides this kind ofinformation.2 Hence a function type will be a pair hM; i, where M is a set of2For an AL-style system on might use typed roles, or mappings from (untyped) roles totypes.
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 70typed variables and  is a type. We thus dene the set of types and the set ofvariables simultaneously.Denition 33 Let Type and Var be the smallest set and family of sets suchthat e; t 2 Type;  2 Type ) v1 ; v2; : : : 2 Var ;  2 Type and xi 2 Vari for i 2 I ) hfxiji 2 Ig; i 2 Type.Let Var = S2Type Var and (x) =  i x = vn .Denition 34 The set of Terms of TDRT are dened by: x 2 Var ) x 2 Term ;  2 Type ) c 2 Term ; t 2 Term and M  Var ) M:t 2 TermhM;i; t 2 Termhfxiji2Ig;i and ti 2 Term(xi) for i 2 I ) t(xi:ti)i2I 2 Term ; t 2 TermhM;ti and t0 2 TermhM 0;ti ) t
 t0 2 TermhM[M 0;ti and t  t0 2Termt; t; t0 2 Termt ) t \ t0; t 2 Termt; t; t0 2 Term ) t := t0 2 Termt.Notice that two DRSs M:t and M 0:t0 are of dierent types if M 6= M 0. Theoperations 
 and thus have to be polymorphic ones, which cannot be expressedby typed constants. Such a simple minded typing scheme is too restrictive to be ofmuch practical use, as it prevents abstraction over DRSs with varying universes.It seems desirable to investigate conceptions of polymorphism and subtyping forthe SAC to make further progress in this direction.For illustrative purposes I will nevertheless give a simple, extensional seman-tics to the system. Let U be a given set of objects, D ! D0 be the full set oftotal functions from D to D0, and we dene the sets D and type correct variableassignments M _!D as follows.
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 71Denition 35 Given a universe U we dene typed domains by: De = U ; Dt = f0; 1g; DhM;i = (M _!Sx2M D(x))! D ,where f 2M _!Sx2M D(x) i dm(f ) =M and f (x) 2 D(x) for all x 2M .Let D =df S2TypeD , and _^; _: be boolean conjunction and negation on Dt.The notation hxi 7! diii2I stands for (truly) partial assignment functions, andf jM is the restriction of f to M .Denition 36 The denotation k  k of TDRT -terms in a model hD;=i undera type correct variable assignment g are dened by: kckg = =(c ); kvn kg = g(vn ); kt := t0kg = 1 i ktkg = kt0kg, otherwise 0; kt \ t0kg = ktkg _^ kt0kg; k   tkg = _: ktkg; kM:tkg = fM _!D ktkgMf ; kt(xi:ti)i2Ikg = ktkg(hxi 7! ktikgii2I); kthM;ti  t0hM 0;tikg = 1 i 8fM _!D ktkg(f ) = 1 ) 9hM 0 _!D kt0kgMf (h) = 1,otherwise 0; kthM;ti 
 t0hM 0;tikg = fM[M 0 _!D ktkgM 0f (f jM ) _^ kt0kgMf (f jM 0).Notice in particular the last clause: we conjoin the conditions s and s0 whenevaluating M:s 
 M 0:s0, while making sure that variables in M [M 0 are in-terpreted by f wherever they are free in s0 or s. This is achieved by not onlyapplying the denotations of M:s and M 0:s0 to suitable restrictions of f , but also
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 72overwriting g by f on the variables to be captured. Only free variables which arenot in the universe of either of the two merged DRSs receive their values from theassignment g, and thus behave as ordinary placeholders whose values are xedby the context of evaluation.Theorem 43 (Merging Principle) j=TDRT M:t
 M 0:t0 = M[M 0: t\ t0PROOF: kM:t
M 0:t0kg = fM[M 0 _!D kM:tkgM 0f (f jM ) _^ kM 0:t0kgMf (f jM 0)= fM[M 0 _!D ktkgM 0Mf f _^ kt0kgMM 0f f = kM[M 0: t \ t0kg. 2In a type free, or more liberally typed system, one may need to introduceadditional structure into the semantics to achieve the same result. This is takenup in the next section.4.3 -DRTIn this section I will introduce a modied semantics for , enriched with thebasic operation 
, which integrates the earlier presented ideas of Henk Zee-vat into the type free SAC. It is also closely related to the system of -DRT[Millies & Pinkal 1992], which syntactically integrates ordinary typed -abstractionwith DRS-formation over variables of type e. An ocial semantics for their sys-tem has not yet been published, and there is reason to think that giving one isnot an entirely straightforward task.3Denition 37 The language DRT consists of terms t; t0 : : : built up from basicconstants c; c0 : : : ;#, and variables x; y : : : 2 Var by means of abstractionM:t, for M  Var, application t(xi:ti)i2I , and merge t
 t0.In contrast to the original SAC semantics we associate not only a particularapplicative behaviour with each object of the domain D but also a unique set of3By the time of writing, a semantics for -DRT, which relies on a somewhat non-standardinterpretation of -abstraction, had been proposed in [Kuschert 1995]. This interpretationseemed somewhat problematic, and has been improved upon, in [Kohlhase et al. 1996]. Acomparison between this semantics and my system should therefore be of some interest.
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 73variables. This makes our domain even more intensional, in the sense that fortwo abstraction terms to denote the same object, they not only have to have thesame applicative behaviour but also must abstract over exactly the same set ofvariables.4 For this to work, we need to turn the power set of Var into a domain,in a way that allows us to obey the continuity requirements of our semantics.Unfortunately the naive approach of using the subset relation to form a cpo won'twork. Instead I assume that Pow(Var) is a at domain of sets of variables, withan added ?PV element, rather than a true power-domain. We need to extend thenotions of set-union and assignment updating to the cases involving ?PV . Thecases involving proper (possibly empty) sets of variables remain as before, andwe dene M [ ?PV = ?PV [M =df ?PV and g?PVf =df ?Var!D.The retraction by means of which abstraction and application are interpretedis thus slightly more complicated in mapping between objects d and pairs hM;i,where M 2 Pow(Var) is the set of roles of d (on the outermost level), and 2 (Var ! D) ! D describes d's applicative behaviour. We thus use domainsD such that D *)	 Pow(Var) ((Var ! D)! D):From this we dene 	1(d) as the rst component of 	(d), also called the rolesof d,5 and 	2(d) as the second component, called the applicative behaviourof d. We write d  f for (	2(d))(f ).Denition 38 A DRT -model consists of a retractionD *)	 Pow(Var)((Var !D) ! D) and an interpretation = which maps constants into D, with =(#) =?D. The denotation function k  k for terms, under a variable assignment g, isgiven by: kckg = =(c); kxkg = g(x);4Translated into AL this means that only Axioms A3 and A7 of the proof theory are nolonger sound in this system. Notice that Rule 4 still holds, giving us a weakened form ofextensionality. The change seems to have no further dramatic impact on the theory developedin chapter 2, as far as I can see. In particular, all encodings of -terms have the same roles,namely z or whatever we choose, and thus weak extensionality for  is preserved.5Such a roles-function is also assumed to exists in [Cooper & Poesio 1994].
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 74 kM:tkg =  hM;fktkgMf i; kt(xi:ti)i2Ikg = ktkg  hxi 7! ktikgii2I; kt
 t0kg =  hM[M 0; f: ktkgM 0f  f _^ kt0kgMf  fi,where M = 	1(ktkg) and M 0 = 	1(kt0kg).Theorem 44 fktkgMf is continuous.PROOF: By induction, along the lines of Theorem 1. I leave it to the readerto adapt monotonicity and the other induction steps, and only show the induc-tion step for 
 here. Recall that h = Fn<! hn. Let Nn = 	1(ktkgMhn ), N 0n =	1(kt0kgMhn), N = 	1(ktkgMh ) and N 0 = 	1(kt0kgMh ). Notice that N = Fn<!Nn,andN 0 = Fn<!N 0n, by the induction hypothesis. Also Fn<! gMNnhnf = Fn<! gMNhnf =gMNhf and Fn<! gMN 0nhnf = Fn<! gMN 0hnf = gMN 0hf .Thus, fkt
 t0kgMf (h) = kt
 t0kgMh=  hN[N 0; f: ktkgMN 0hf  f _^ kt0kgMNhf  fi=  hN[N 0; f: ktkFn<! gMN 0nhnf  f _^ kt0kFn<! gMNnhnf  f )i=  hFn<! Nn [ Fm<! N 0m; f: Fn<! ktkgMN 0nhnf  f _^ Fm<! kt0kgMNnhmf  fi=  hFn<!(Nn[N 0n); Fn<!(f: ktkgMN 0nhnf  f _^ kt0kgMNnhnf  f )i= Fn<!  hNn[N 0n; f: ktkgMN 0nhnf  f _^ kt0kgMNnhnf  fi= Fn<! kt
 t0kgMhn = Fn<! fkt
 t0kgMf (hn). 2The semantics of 
 bears close resemblance to the one in the typed system ofthe previous section. _^ is the semantic operation of conjunction, i.e. d _^d0 =dfkx\x0kgxx0dd0 . The addition of the set of argument roles as a component of themeaning of terms allows us to capture free variables in the intended way: just asin TDRT those free variables of a DRS which are abstracted in the other DRS ofa merge-expression are caught, while others remain free to be accessed by otherabstractions.Theorem 45 (Merging Principle) j=DRT M:t
 M 0:t0 = M[M 0: t \ t0.
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 75PROOF: kM:t
 M 0:t0kg=  hM[M 0; f: kM:tkgM 0f  f _^ kM 0:t0kgMf  fi=  hM[M 0; f: ktkgM 0Mf f _^ kt0kgMM 0f f i=  hM[M 0; f: ktkgM 0[Mf _^ kt0kgM[M 0f i=  hM[M 0; f: kt\ t0kgM[M 0f i= kM[M 0: t \ t0kg. 2Capturing free variables is clearly possible in this way, but we cannot hopeto increase the catch by applications to terms containing such free variables. Forexample, we cannot derive an equation where the VP content zfg:Gxz containsan anaphoric reference `x' to the content P:fxg:Fx
 Px of the subject NP,6 asin (6j=) (P:fxg:Fx
 Px) (zfg:Gxz) = fxg:Fx
 fg:Gxx :It has been assumed in -DRT that such equations hold, without havinggiven a semantic justication for them. But this is not a problem that can't besurmounted. We simply use the u- and t-operators of DMG, from chapter 3.2,to get a cleaned up version of this form of variable capture. Recall their denitionas DM:t and t( _x: _x) _x2DM from that section, where DM is some innite subsetof the variables. The following is valid in our -DRT, given _x 2 DM :(P:f _xg:F _x
 tP _x) u(zfg:G _xz) = f _xg:F _x
( t uzfg:G _xz) _x = f _xg:F _x
fg:G _x _xwhich by the MP reduces to f _xg(F _x\G _x _x).Notice that this kind of system uses three apparently dierent kinds of ab-straction: ordinary unary -abstraction, abstraction over the universes of DRSs,and u-abstraction to \intensionalize" over discourse marker assignments. Yetthese three operations are in fact, as I have shown, instances of one and the sameform of abstraction, namely simultaneous abstraction, as it is formalised in  andAL. The present modication in the semantics of the SAC in this section does6This example assumes that anaphora are resolved before the compositional DRS construc-tion takes place. For a dierent approach see [Asher 1993].
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 76not aect that result.I thus propose DMG style \intensional" application tdt0e as a general modeof semantic composition for -DRT, in order to extend the capturing of variablesbeyond the scope of 
. Having the extra level of abstraction u in the represen-tation uU:C of DRSs is also useful for giving a truth{axiom for . If we wouldinsist on using free variables, as in standard DRT, we would be unable to regard as an operator, or constant, which takes two terms to form a complex one,whose denotation under assignment g is a function of the denotations of its argu-ments under g.7 The additional abstraction u over all discourse markers allowsus to view  as a constant, as we did in the earlier system of Kamp Structures.Instead of PTY M we therefore need a similar predicate DRSMDM , which refersto the second level of argument roles of ( u-lifted) DRSs. Given two lifted DRSsuU:C and uU 0:C 0, we get a condition uU:C  uU 0:C 0 which is also lifted,in the sense that it needs to be applied to a discourse marker assignment to forma proposition.I will state the new axiom of truth in semantic terms here, rather than insome variant of FOLSAC . Let _ be the operation that interprets the constant.Denition 39 1. DRSMDM (d) ,df 8f dm(f )  DM )	1(d  f ) =M ^ 8h dm(h)  M ) d  f  h 2 P.2. CNDDM(d) ,df 8f dm(f )  DM ) d  f 2 P.3. A Kamp Structure for -DRT is a DRT -model with subsets T ;P obey-ing the Proposition Structure axioms, such that for all d; d0 2 D:DRSMDM (d) ^DRSM 0DM (d0) ) CNDDM(d _d0) ^8f dm(f )  DM ) (d _d0)  f 2 T ,8h dm(h)  M ^ (d  f  h) 2 T ) 9k dm(k)  M 0 ^ (d0  fMh  k) 2 T .7Notice that 
 is not treated as a term here for this reason: kt 
 t0kg is not a function ofktkg and kt0kg, but of ktk, kt0k and g, similar to kM:tkg being a function of ktk, g and M , notof ktkg and M .
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 77One might want to always abstract over all discourse markers of a DRS, thusuniformly representing DRSs hU;Ci as uU:C 0 rather than U:C 0. The merge-operator could be redened in a suitable way, or simply be lifted to u( tt
 tt0),with the expected result. The conjunction of conditions could be lifted similarly.Here are some simple facts about lifted DRSs and conditions.Theorem 46 1. DRSMDM (t) ^DRSM 0DM (t) ) M =M 0.2. DRSMDM (t) ^DRSM 0DM (t0) ) DRSM[M 0DM ( u( tt 
 tt0)).3. CNDDM(t) ^CNDDM(t0) ) CNDDM( u( tt \ tt0)).Yet, a sweeping use of abstractions seems unnecessary to me, and I preferto make only minimal use of cups and caps, along the lines of the earlier DMGfragment. I hope the resulting variation in the representation of DRSs, sometimesusing u, sometimes not, will not confuse too much here. Perhaps parsimonyshould be sacriced for generality here.4.3.1 ConsistencyLet me show how to adapt the xed point construction for Kamp Structures tothe new axiom. We need to make sure that (d _d0)  f cannot be equal to theapplication of any other logical constant to its arguments, or of the same logicalconstant to dierent arguments. We thus setd =df kfz1; z2ghXi 7!xiixi2Var:hhr; (z1:z1; z2:z2); (xi:Xi)xi2VariikgThe new axiom may be reformulated as:(Ax) PC(P; f; h;M;N )) (d  f  h 2 P and ( d  f  f 2 T ,TC(T ; f; h;M;N ) )):with the proposition condition DRSMDM (f (z1))^DRSNDM (f (z2))^dm(h)  DM ,and the truth condition 8k dm(k)  M ^ (f (z1)  h  k) 2 T ) 9k0 dm(k0) N ^ (f (z2)  hMk  k0) 2 T .
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 78We keep the denition of K from 3.3.3, letting dl;f;h =df dl f h for l = ;and dl;f;h =df dl  f otherwise.Lemma 47 Any xed point for K satises Ax.PROOF: Again only case (iii) of the original proof is of interest. (iii) LetPC(P; f; h;M;N ) and dfh 2 T . Then there are l; f 0; h0;M 0; N 0 with dfh = dl;f 0 ;h0, such that PCl(P; f 0; h0;M 0; N 0) and TCl(T ; f 0; h0;M 0; N 0). But thenl =, f (z1) = f 0(z1), f (z2) = f 0(z2), and h = h0. Hence PC(P; f; h;M 0; N 0),which implies by theorem 45.1 that M = M 0, and N = N 0. ThereforeTC(T ; f; h;M;N ). 2The other logical constants behave as before. So we conclude:Theorem 48 Every non trivial model can be extended to a Kamp Structure forDRT .4.3.2 Some -DRT TranslationsI present the same Categorial Grammar fragment as for DMG here, where I tryto give translations that are very close to DMG yet result in appropriate DRSs.We use the same categories, and slash elimination rules. I delete the tautologicalassertion `true' from any conjunction, to make things more readable. To savebrackets I assume the scope of operators to be narrowest for t, and increasinglywider for application (bracketing to the left), \, universe{abstraction, 
, andunary -abstraction.(=E) if  1 =) A=B : t1 and  2 =) B : t2 then  1 2 =) A : t1dt2e(nE) if  1 =) B : t1 and  2 =) BnA : t2 then  1 2 =) A : t2dt1e
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 79` _x[every]' =) (s=(nns))=cn : : fg t(df _xgtrue
 t _xe  d t _xe)`man' =) cn : x: fgman(x)`with' =) (cnncn)=(s=(nns)) : : ( t )
 t dy:fgwith(; y)e` _y[a]' =) (s=(nns))=cn : : f _ygtrue
 t _y 
 t _y`donkey' =) cn : x: fgdonkey(x)`beats' =) (nns)=(s=(nns)) : : t dy:fgbeat(; y)e` _y[it]' =) (s=(nns)) : : t _y` _y[a] donkey' =) s=(nns) :: f _ygtrue
 tdx:fgdonkey(x)e _y 
 t _y: f _ygtrue
 x:fgdonkey(x) _y 
 t _y: f _ygtrue
 fgdonkey( _y)
 t _y: f _ygtrue\ donkey( _y)
 t _y: f _ygdonkey( _y)
 t _y`with _y[a] donkey' =) cnncn :: ( t ) 
 td: f _ygdonkey( _y)
 t _ye dy:fgwith(; y)e: ( t ) 
 (:f _ygdonkey( _y)
 t _y) dy:fgwith(; y)e: ( t ) 
 (f _ygdonkey( _y)
 tdy:fgwith(; y)e _y): ( t ) 
 (f _ygdonkey( _y)
 fgwith(; _y)): ( t ) 
 (f _ygdonkey( _y) \with(; _y))`man with _y[a] donkey' =) cn :: tdx: fgman(x)e  
 (f _ygdonkey( _y) \ with(; _y)): fgman() 
 (f _ygdonkey( _y) \ with(; _y)): f _ygman() \ donkey( _y) \with(; _y)` _x[every] man with _y[a] donkey' =) s=(nns) :: fg t(df _xgtrue
 td: f _ygman() \ donkey( _y) \with(; _y)e _xe  d t _xe): fg t(df _xgtrue
 f _ygman( _x) \ donkey( _y) \ with( _x; _y)e  d t _xe): fg t(df _x; _ygman( _x) \ donkey( _y) \with( _x; _y)e  d t _xe)
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 80`beats _y[it]' =) nns :: td: t _ye dy:fgbeat(; y)e: tdy:fgbeat(; y)e _y: fgbeat(; _y)` _x[every] man with _y[a] donkey beats _y[it] ' =) s :fg t(df _x; _ygman( _x) \ donkey( _y) \with( _x; _y)e  d td:fgbeat(; _y)e _xe)fg t(df _x; _ygman( _x) \ donkey( _y) \with( _x; _y)e  dfgbeat( _x; _y)e)4.4 A Note on Appropriateness and RestrictionsThe Situation Theory of [Barwise & Cooper 1991] contains a rather sophisticatedtheory of appropriateness of assignments for abstracts. Any object carries appro-priateness conditions with it, which have to be met by its arguments if appli-cation is to be dened. One particular way of introducing such appropriatenessconstraints on abstracts is by using a restriction operator o. It links truthto identity in a presuppositional way:() T (t0)! (t o t0) = t ^ :T (t0) ! (t o t0) = #:With such an axiom one can impose additional presuppositions t0X1::Xn intoan abstract, to form hXi 7!xiini=1:(tX1::Xn o t0X1::Xn). This applies to (xi:ti)ni=1 toresult in [ti=Xi]ni=1t only if [ti=Xi]ni=1t0 is true.Unfortunately the axiom () is inconsistent with Proposition Structures: takesome term t which does not denote ?, then the above version implies thatx:(t := (t o x)) internally denes truth, which is inconsistent, as we saw ear-lier. One might try to use a weaker version instead:() T (t0)! (t o t0) = t ^ F (t0)! (t o t0) = #:I do not know whether () is consistent with respect to Proposition Struc-tures. What is demonstrably consistent,8 is to have just restricted propositions,8To prove this, one just has to account for the fact that the proposition condition PCo is
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 81following [Plotkin 1990], such that:(Axo) P (t) ^ T (t0) ! P (t o t0) ^ T (t o t0) $ T (t):This axiom is certainly a less powerful tool for introducing presuppositionsthan (), which might motivate us to change our relatively naive treatment ofundenedness.9 As things stand, I have no notion of appropriateness for theSAC beyond the rather weak principles governing #, and those obtained fromthe conditions for the formation of propositions.4.5 ConclusionI have shown that a minor change from the strictly ordered -calculus to a the-ory of simultaneous abstraction, which would seem well motivated by word orderconsiderations alone, is enough to recreate three of the currently most inuentialsemantic theories. I have established some fundamental results concerning vari-ants of this form of abstraction, including equivalences between the basic SAC,an Aczel{Lunnon style system, and a Combinatory Logic version. Completenessand conuence theorems were obtained.I have used Frege Structure style axioms to obtain Dynamic Montague Gram-mar, Discourse Representation Theory, and Situation Theory. DMGwas obtainedvia Chierchia's Dynamic Property Theory. ST was shown to be easily obtainedby adding a simple theory of events and strong negation to the basic PropertyTheory. A simple minded Property Theoretic DRT was obtained as well, byadding an axiom for conditionals. The disadvantages of this system motivated aslight change in the semantics of the SAC, which allowed for a more satisfactoryformulation of DRT. The resulting system can be considered as a semanticallykosher, highly intensional relative of -DRT, with only one underlying form ofdened with respect to T , as well as P, in the xed point construction. Everything else worksas before.9I'm indebted to Peter Aczel for pointing out that there is no easy x for () by restrictingthe equality axiom of Proposition Structures, to produce propositions only if both sides of theequation are dened. A deeper re-think of the treatment of undenedness is required if we want() to hold.
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DIRECTIONS 82abstraction, appearing in three dierent guises.I believe the SAC together with Property Theoretic axioms provides a pow-erful framework for linguistic semantics. It provides an elegant machinery ofhigh generality and simplicity, and appears to make good philosophical as well asmethodological sense. I feel that I have only scratched the surface of the logicaland linguistic issues involved, yet I hope this may suce to suggest that such aframework is worth having, and that the eort to obtain it is relatively modest.
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